

## **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010**

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**TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2009**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met at 10:28 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Feinstein, Murray, Specter, Cochran, Bond, and Shelby.

### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

#### **OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

#### **STATEMENTS OF:**

**HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT  
CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**ACCOMPANIED BY HON. ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DE-  
FENSE (COMPTROLLER)**

#### **STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE**

Chairman INOUE. This morning the subcommittee is pleased to welcome Dr. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to testify on the administration's budget for fiscal year 2010. Mr. Secretary, while the full Senate Appropriations Committee has already had the pleasure of meeting with you earlier this year regarding the so-called supplemental bill, let me extend a warm welcome to you on behalf of the Defense Subcommittee.

Your continued willingness to put your Nation's needs ahead of your personal interests demonstrates your unwavering commitment to public service and your dedication to the men and women in our military, and our Nation owes you a great debt of gratitude.

The administration has requested \$534 billion for the base budget of the Department of Defense, an increase of \$21 billion over the amount enacted in the last fiscal year. Additionally, the administration has requested \$130 billion in supplemental nonemergency funding for overseas contingency operations in the next fiscal year.

Mr. Secretary, you have called this a reform budget and in recent months you have given several keynote speeches emphasizing in particular the need for greater balance in our force structure be-

tween competing requirements for irregular warfare and conventional warfare and for changing the way the Defense Department does business. This budget request before us reflects these priorities and, as you're well aware, it will raise a few questions.

A key theme you have emphasized in recent months is the need to improve an institutional home in the Department of Defense for the warfighter engaged in the current irregular fight. Much of the critical force protection equipment that is used with great success in the theater today has been funded outside the regular defense budget process and is being managed by newly created ad hoc organizations that appear to be temporary in nature.

For example, since 2005 the Department has procured over 16,000 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, funded entirely with supplemental appropriations. Yet even after 5 years, the role of these vehicles in our force structure and the future role of the office that manages this program within the Department are undefined.

Another example is the ISR Task Force, which is to accelerate the fielding of critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets into the theater. You have made it a point to emphasize these capabilities by adding \$2 billion to the base budget for the ISR capabilities. Yet the role of this task force within the Department's institutional chain of command remains ad hoc and the future is undetermined.

There's no question that these capabilities will be needed in the future. So we hope today you can illustrate to the subcommittee how we can institutionalize the lessons learned with respect to equipping our warfighter and permanently address the warfighter's requirements in the DOD bureaucracy without continuously adding bureaucratic layers.

At the same time, Mr. Secretary, conventional threats to our national security remain. While irregular warfare is and will presumably continue to be the preferred tactic of non-state actors, we cannot lose sight of threats from traditional nation states such as North Korea, Iran, and others. So as we consider the many adjustments your budget proposes to modernize programs designed to address conventional threats, it is important that we understand the strategic underpinnings and consequences of curtailing or terminating programs such as the F-22, the C-17 transport, or future combat systems manned ground vehicles.

Now, there's no question, Mr. Secretary, that the requirements to winning irregular conflicts have been neglected too long. But I believe we must ensure that we strike the right balance between preparing for both irregular and regular wars, and we look forward to hearing your thoughts on that matter.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, your budget emphasizes our Nation's greatest military asset, the All Volunteer Force, by fully funding end strength growth, providing for increased medical research, and increased funding for warfighter families. These programs have long been funded through supplemental appropriations and we welcome your commitment to our servicemembers and their families by institutionalizing these programs in the base budget.

On the other hand, the rising military personnel and healthcare costs are creating budget pressures on our acquisition programs,

calling into question the affordability of many high-priced platforms designed to meet specific military requirements.

So, gentlemen, we have much to discuss this morning. We very much appreciate your being here with us today and we look forward to your testimony. However, before proceeding with your opening statements, may I call upon the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Cochran, for comments.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to join you in welcoming the distinguished panel to review the budget request of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, and Comptroller Hale, we appreciate the hard work you're doing and the challenges you face, and we want to be sure that what we do will help deal with the problems that we face in the national security arena, and we thank you for your distinguished service.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Leahy.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to see the Secretary and Admiral Mullen. I've had many conversations with them and I appreciate their help, as well as Mr. Hale's assistant. I just had an opportunity to lead a Senate delegation on a trip to Iraq and Pakistan and Afghanistan. You've made some visits of your own there, which I think is of significance to the troops, although I think they're probably more excited to see Steven Colbert than they were to see me.

But we did see some extremely hard-working men and women in uniform in each of the places we went. We also saw our coalition forces, especially in Afghanistan, working diligently and taking a large number of casualties. Canada, our neighbor to the North, has had many, as have other coalition nations, and yet they're working very, very hard.

I wanted to be there because, as I've mentioned before, Mr. Secretary, the end of the year we'll see 1,800 members, up to 1,800 members, of the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from the Vermont National Guard going there. They're one of the only units with mountain skills. They train both summertime and in 20 degree below zero weather in Vermont in the wintertime. They are training very hard.

I will, Mr. Chairman, ask some questions on that. Of course, I'm very proud of these men and women that are going. But this is the largest deployment we've ever had. I see Senator Feinstein here. It would be the equivalent on a per capita basis of about 100,000 people going from California.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your response and your willingness to work with us on some of the special situations the Guard will have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to welcome Secretary Gates here, Admiral Mullen, and Comptroller Hale. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you, Senator Shelby. Senator Feinstein. Senator FEINSTEIN. No opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I just welcome Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.  
Chairman INOUE. Senator Bond.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen. We congratulate you on the progress you're making in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's not easy, but I think you have a way ahead with the counterinsurgency strategy. I will be back to ask some questions, but two points I want to raise with you.

First, you have said we need to shift away from the 99 percent exquisite, service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, deploy in limited quantities, and we must look more to the 80 percent multiservice solutions that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to know how that fits with the recommendation in the overhead area to go with the NGE0 when there are a number of less expensive solutions that can provide a multitude of opportunities for getting the overhead collection we need. Chair Feinstein and I on the Intelligence Committee have been looking at that very intensely and we would like to continue the discussions with you on that.

The second thing, Admiral Roughead recently stated the F/A-18E and F is the aviation backbone of our Navy's ability to project power ashore, and the way the numbers of carrier-capable strike fighters will decrease between 2016 and 2020 to affect our air wing capacity effectiveness. We had asked last year and actually set in law a requirement that there be a report on the multiyear procurement of the F/A-18. I believe that was due in March. We think that is a very important element to consider, particularly with the delays in time, the budget being exceeded, and the failure to meet operational standards of the plane forecast to take its place to date.

So I will look forward to asking more about those and may have some questions for the record. I have another meeting I have to go to, but I will come back for the questions. I thank the chairman and the members of the subcommittee for the indulgence.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for inviting us to discuss the details of the President's fiscal year 2010 defense budget. There is a tremendous amount of material here and I know that there are a number of questions, so I'll keep my opening remarks brief and focus on the strategy and thinking behind many of these recommendations. My submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions.

First and foremost, as you suggested and commented on, Mr. Chairman, this is a reform budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world now and in the future. I visited Afghanistan last month and as we increase our presence there and refocus our efforts with a new strategy, I wanted to get a sense

from the ground level of the challenges and needs so we can give our troops the equipment and the support to be successful and come home safely.

Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders unvarnished and unscripted has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source for ideas on what this Department needs to do, both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job; now it is time for us in Washington to do ours.

In many respects this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with troops and commanders and everything that I have learned over the past 2½ years, all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives: First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the All Volunteer Force, which in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of this business right, none of the other decisions will matter.

Second, to rebalance this Department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

Third, in order to do this we must reform how and what we buy, making a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony. The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for fiscal year 2010, a 4 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is in fact sufficient to maintain our defense posture, especially during a time of war. I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our Nation must not do what we have done after various previous times of conflict on so many occasions and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch.

This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term, that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the war through the regular budgeting process, as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for this Department.

This budget aims to alter many programs and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions. First, sustainability. By that I mean sustainability in light

of current and potential fiscal constraints. It simply is not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our Nation with a base budget of more than half a trillion dollars, and I believe this budget focuses money where it can most effectively do that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and Congress to Congress. Eliminating waste and ending requirements creep, terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to a more reasonable level will reduce this friction.

Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the ones we have been traditionally best suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries, who in the real world also have finite resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built on land, at sea, and in the air to stop the Soviets during the cold war.

At the same time, this budget robustly funds many modernization programs that will sustain our significant advantages for potential future conflict. Where certain modernization programs have been cancelled because of acquisition, technological or requirements issues, such as FCS vehicles, it is our intention to re-launch those modernization programs on a much sounder and more sustainable basis after completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the nuclear posture review, the ballistic missile defense review, and the space policy review later this year.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last 8 years, on the battlefield and, perhaps just as importantly, institutionally at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this Department first and foremost is to fight and win the Nation's wars, not just constantly prepare for them. We have to do better. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve and this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of war and prepares for the future, about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter in the long term, about the role of the services in how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight, about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do, the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum. A dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from capability

we do need, often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT

Once again, I thank you for this subcommittee's ongoing support of our men and women in uniform, and we look forward to your questions.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  
[The statement follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

##### INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's fiscal year 2010 defense budget. First and foremost, this is a reform budget—reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

I was in Afghanistan last month. As we increase our presence there—and refocus our efforts with a new strategy—I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of what the challenges and needs are so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders—unvarnished and unscripted—has from the moment I took this job been the single greatest source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with service members, and all that I have learned over the past 2½ years—all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, which I will discuss as I go through the different parts of the budget.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for fiscal year 2010—a 4 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there has been some discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture—especially during a time of war. I believe it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our Nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term—that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

I will break this down into three sections: our people, today's warfighter, and the related topics of acquisition reform and modernization.

##### OUR PEOPLE

Starting with the roll-out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win, and to survive while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they return. So, the top-priority recommendation I made to the President was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and long-term funding. To take care of people, this budget request includes, among other priorities:

- \$136 billion to fully protect and properly fund military personnel costs—an increase of nearly \$11 billion over the fiscal year 2009 budget level. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps and Army will meet their respective end-strengths of 202,100 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year, so this money will be for sustaining those force levels in fiscal year 2010 and beyond;
- \$47.4 billion to fund military health care;
- \$3.3 billion for wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs, including \$400 million for research and development. We have recognized the critical and permanent nature of these programs by institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget; and
- \$9.2 billion for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education, some of which was previously funded in the bridge and supplemental budgets.

We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Overall, we have shifted \$8 billion for items or programs recently funded in war-related appropriations into the base budget.

#### TODAY'S WARFIGHTER

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment—a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and must have a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs and similar to what I have tried to do with programs to support our troops. The fiscal year 2010 budget reflects this thinking:

First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include:

- Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by fiscal year 2011 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago;
- Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq; and
- Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

Second, we will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to boost our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters—an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now. Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Third, to strengthen global partnership efforts, we will fund \$550 million for key initiatives. These include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

Fourth, to grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,400—or 4 percent—and will buy more aircraft for special operations forces. We will also increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)—a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions—from two to three ships in fiscal year 2010.

Fifth, to improve our intra-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

And, finally, we will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus the previously planned 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength to 547,400. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss—which often occurs because certain specialties are in high demand. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

#### ACQUISITION REFORM AND INSOURCING

In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I welcome legislative initiatives in the Congress to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with lawmakers in this regard. This budget will support these goals by:



- Reducing the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replacing them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,800 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010 to replace contractors and up to 33,600 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next 5 years;
- Increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce, converting 10,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 10,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015—beginning with 4,080 in fiscal year 2010; and
- Terminating and delaying programs whose costs are out of hand, whose technologies are immature, or whose requirements are questionable—for example, the VH-71 presidential helicopter.

#### MODERNIZATION

We must be prepared for the future—prepared for challenges we can see on the horizon and ones that we may not even have imagined. I know that some people may think I am too consumed by the current wars to give adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. This budget provides \$186 billion for modernization, which belies that claim.

As I went through the budget deliberations process, a number of principles guided my decisions:

The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising, but as yet unproven, technologies, while continuing to produce—and, as necessary, upgrade—systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and instead build more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites.

Second, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat, or accomplish roughly the same mission, we must look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. The Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, for example, had major development and cost problems to be sure. But what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the services' modernization portfolios.

Third, I looked at whether modernization programs had incorporated the experiences of combat operations since September 11th. This was particularly important to the ground services, which will be in the lead for irregular and hybrid campaigns of the future. The Future Combat Systems' ground vehicle component was particularly problematic in this regard.

Fourth, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent "exquisite" service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, then are deployed in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change, and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers.

This relates to a final guiding principle: the need for balance—to think about future conflicts in a different way—to recognize that the black and white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and platforms to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio—a mixture of capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies. It is my hope that the Quadrennial Defense Review will give us a more rigorous analytical framework for dealing with a number of these issues. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow-on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. But where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations.

## AIR CAPABILITIES

This budget demonstrates a serious commitment to maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American military strength for more than six decades. The key points of this budget as it relates to air capabilities are:

- An increase in funding from \$6.8 to \$10.4 billion for the fifth-generation F-35, which reflects a purchase of 30 planes for fiscal year 2010 compared to 14 in fiscal year 2009. This money will also accelerate the development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and avoid the development issues that arose in the early stages of the F-22 program. More than 500 F-35s will be produced over the next 5 years, with more than 2,400 total for all the services. Russia is probably 6 years away from Initial Operating Capability of a fifth-generation fighter and the Chinese are 10 to 12 years away. By then we expect to have more than 1,000 fifth-generation fighters in our inventory;
- This budget completes the purchase of 187 F-22 fighters—representing 183 planes plus the four funded in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses;
- We will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production to meet current and future needs;
- To replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer. Our aging tankers, the lifeblood of any expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement;
- We will retire approximately 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2010; and
- Before continuing with a program for a next-generation manned bomber, we should first assess the requirements and what other capabilities we might have for this mission—and wait for the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the outcome of post-START arms-control negotiations.

## MARITIME CAPABILITIES

The United States must not take its current maritime dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel to ensure that dominance in the future. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to reconsider a number of assumptions—a process that will, as I mentioned, be greatly helped by the QDR.

We must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. We cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000: since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled.

The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs. This budget will:

- Shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a 5-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040;
- Delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy; and
- Delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship to fiscal year 2011 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the Nation needs.

The Department will continue to invest in areas where the need and capability are proven by:

- Accelerating the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big, blue-water surface combatants;
- Adding \$200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities;
- Beginning the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine; and
- Using fiscal year 2010 funds to complete the third DDG-1000 Destroyer and build one DDG-51 Destroyer. The three DDG-1000 class ships will be built at Bath Iron Works in Maine and the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program will be restarted at Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi.

## LAND CAPABILITIES

As we have seen these last few years, our land forces will continue to bear the burdens of the wars we are in—and also the types of conflicts we may face in the future, even if not on the same scale. As I said earlier, we are on track with the expansion of the ground forces, and have added money for numerous programs that directly support warfighters and their families.

Since 1999, the Army has been pursuing its Future Combat Systems—an effort to simultaneously modernize most of its platforms, from the way individual soldiers communicate to the way mechanized divisions move. Parts of the FCS program have already demonstrated their adaptability and relevance to today's conflicts. For example, the connectivity of the Warfighter Information Network will dramatically increase the agility and situational awareness of the Army's combat formations.

But the FCS vehicle program is, despite some adjustments, based on the same assumptions as when FCS was first conceived. The premise behind the design of these vehicles is that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency, and, above all, near-total situational awareness, compensate for less heavy armor—a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare, and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I would also note that the current vehicle program does not include a role for our recent \$25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

With that in mind:

- We have canceled the existing FCS ground vehicle program, and will reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach and then relaunch a new Army vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process;
- The FCS budget in fiscal year 2010 is \$3 billion. I have directed that the new FCS program be fully funded in the out-years; and
- We will accelerate FCS's Warfighter Information Network development and field it, along with proven FCS spin-off capabilities, across the entire Army.

## MISSILE DEFENSE

The United States has made great technological progress on missile defense in the last two decades, but a number of questions remain about certain technologies and the balance between research and development on one hand, and procurement on the other. This is one area where I believe the overall sustainability of the program depends on our striking a better balance. To this end, this budget will:

- Restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats—threats that North Korea's missile launch reminds us are real;
- Cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the program's proposed operational role is highly questionable;
- Terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.2 billion; and
- Increase by \$700 million funding for our most capable theater missile defense systems like the THAAD and SM-3 programs.

## CYBER SECURITY

To improve cyberspace capabilities, this budget:

- Increases funding for a broad range of Information Assurance capabilities to improve the security of our information as it is generated, stored, processed, and transported across our IT systems;
- Increases the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by fiscal year 2011; and
- Establishes a cyber test range.

There is no doubt that the integrity and security of our computer and information systems will be challenged on an increasing basis in the future. Keeping our cyber infrastructure safe is one of our most important national-security challenges. While information technology has dramatically improved our military capabilities, our reliance on data networks has at the same time left us more vulnerable. Our networks are targets for exploitation, and potentially disruption or destruction, by a growing

number of entities that include foreign governments, non-state actors, and criminal elements.

#### OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process—as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Department of Defense.

We are asking for \$130 billion to directly support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is less than the \$141.7 billion we asked for last year through the bridge fund and the remaining supplemental request—which in part reflects shifting some programs into the base budget.

The OCO request includes \$74.1 billion to maintain our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq—from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves.

- In Afghanistan, this will support an average of 68,000 military members and six Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents—plus support personnel; and
  - In Iraq, this will fund an average of 100,000 military members, but also reflects the President's decision to cut force levels to six Advisory and Assistance Brigades by August 31, 2010. Compared to the fiscal year 2008 enacted levels for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we are asking for less than half.
- Aside from supporting direct operations, the OCO funding also includes, among other programs:
- \$17.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in theater. The major items include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, trucks, Humvees, Bradleys, Strykers, other tactical vehicles, munitions, radios, and various combat support equipment;
  - \$15.2 billion for force protection, which includes \$5.5 billion for MRAPs—\$1.5 billion to procure 1,080 new MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) for Afghanistan and \$4 billion for sustainment, upgrades, and other costs for MRAPs already fielded or being fielded.
  - \$7.5 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Ultimately, the Afghan people will shoulder the responsibility for their own security, so we must accelerate our training of their security forces in order to get more Afghans into the fight;
  - \$1.5 billion for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP)—a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability;
  - \$1.4 billion for military construction—most of which will go toward infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan to support our increased troop levels; and
  - \$700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan—for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires military and civilian capabilities. This is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

#### CONCLUSION

Let me close with a few final thoughts.

This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our Nation with a base budget of more than half a trillion dollars—and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending "requirements creep," terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second of all, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight—not just the wars we have traditionally been best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built—on land, at sea, or in the air—to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last 8 years—on the battlefield and, perhaps just as important, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars—not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would, however, ask you to look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do—at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman INOUE. Admiral Mullen.

#### STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, distinguished members of this subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Let me start by saying I fully support not only the President's fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this Department, but more specifically the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it. He presided over a comprehensive and collaborative process the likes of which, quite frankly, I've not seen in more than a decade of doing this sort of work in the Pentagon.

Over the course of several months and a long series of meetings and debates, every service chief and every combatant commander had a voice and every one of them used it. Normally, as you know, budget proposals are worked from the bottom up, with each service making the case for specific programs and then fighting it out at the end to preserve those that are most important to them. This proposal was done from the top down. Secretary Gates gave us broad guidance, his overall vision, and then gave us the opportunity to meet it.

Everything was given a fresh look and everything had to be justified. Decisions to curtail or eliminate a program were based solely on its relevance and on its execution. The same can be said for those we decided to keep. If we are why we buy, I believe the force we are asking you to help us buy today is the right one, both for the world we're living in and the world we may find ourselves living in 20 to 30 years down the road.

This submission before you is just as much a strategy as it is a reform budget. First and foremost, it makes people our top stra-

tegic priority. I've said many times and I remain convinced, the best way to guarantee our future security is to support our troops and their families. It is the recruit and the retain choices of our families and, quite frankly, American citizens writ large, that will make or break the All Volunteer Force. They will be less inclined to make those decisions should we not be able to offer them viable career options, adequate healthcare, suitable housing, advanced education, and the promise of a prosperous life long after they've taken off the uniform.

This budget devotes more than one-third of the total request to what I would call the people account, with the great majority of that figure, nearly \$164 billion, going to pay military pay and healthcare. I am particularly proud of the funds we've dedicated to caring for our wounded. There is in my view no higher duty for this Nation or for those of us in leadership positions than to care for those who sacrificed so much and who must now face lives forever changed by wounds both seen and unseen.

I know you share that feeling, and thank you for the work you've done in this subcommittee and throughout the Congress to pay attention to these needs and to the needs of the families of our fallen. Our commitment to all of them must be for the remainder of their lives.

That's why this budget allocates funds to complete the construction of additional wounded warrior complexes, expands the pilot program designed to expedite the processing of injured troops through the disability evaluation system, increases the number of mental health professionals assigned to deployed units, and devotes more resources to the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries.

After nearly 8 years of war, we are the most capable and combat experienced military we've ever been, certainly without question the world's best counterinsurgency force. Yet, for all this success, we are pressed and still lack a proper balance between OPTEMPO and home tempo, between unconventional and conventional capabilities, between readiness today and readiness tomorrow.

That, Mr. Chairman, is the second reason this budget of ours acts as a strategy for the future. It seeks balance. By investing more heavily in critical enablers, such as aviation, special forces, cyber operations, civil affairs, language skills, it rightly makes winning the wars we are in our top operational priority. By adjusting active army BCT growth to 45, it helps ensure our ability to impact the fight sooner, increase dwell time, and reduce our overall demand on equipment. By authorizing Secretary Gates to transfer money to the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization, it puts more civilian professionals alongside warfighters in more places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

I said it before, but it bears repeating: More boots on the ground are important, but they will never be completely sufficient. We need people with graphing tablets and shovels and teaching degrees. We need bankers and farmers and law enforcement experts.

As we draw down responsibly in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we need a more concerted effort to build up the capacity of our partners. The same can be said of Pakistan, where boots on the ground aren't even an option.

Some will argue this budget devotes too much money to these sorts of low intensity needs, that it tilts dangerously away from conventional capabilities. In my view it does not. A full 35 percent of this submission is set aside for modernization and much of that will go to what we typically consider conventional requirements. We know there are global risks and threats out there not tied directly to the fight against Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, threats like those we awoke to on this past Memorial Day, when the stability of an entire region was shaken by the increasing beligerence of North Korea.

The work of defending this Nation does not fit nicely into any one bucket. It spans the entire spectrum of conflict. We must be ready to deter and win all wars, big and small, near and far. With this budget submission, the Nation is getting the military it needs for that challenge. It's getting a strategy for the future.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you all for your continued support and for all you do to support the men and women of the United States military and their families.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen.  
[The statement follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN

Chairman Inouye, Senator Cochran, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to report on the posture of the United States Armed Forces.

First, I would like to thank our Service men and women and their families. Those who defend this Nation and the families who support them remain our most valuable national assets and deserve continued gratitude. I want especially to honor the sacrifices of our wounded, their families, and the families of the fallen. We are redefining our duty to them as a Nation, a duty which I believe lasts for life. I thank everyone in this distinguished body for their continued efforts in support of this cause.

Your Armed Forces stand as the most combat experienced in this Nation's history. Deeply experienced from decades of deployments in harm's way and from 7½ years of war, they have remained resilient beyond every possible expectation. They make me, and every American, very proud.

I am grateful for your understanding of the stress our Armed Forces and their families are under. Your recognition of their burdens and uncertainties has been a vital constant throughout these challenging times. Thank you for your support of initiatives such as transferring G.I. Bill benefits to military spouses and children, military spouse employment support, expanded childcare and youth programs, homeowner's assistance programs, and, most importantly, long-term comprehensive support of Wounded Warrior families.

This testimony comes after a notable transition of administration, the first during wartime since 1968 and the first since the 9/11 attacks on the homeland. Conducted in the face of threats and continued wartime missions overseas, the transition was marked by courtesy and concern for the mission and our forces from start to finish. Transition obviously means change, but in this case, it also meant continuity in providing for the common defense. Continuity has been and is particularly important at this juncture as we implement the key strategic changes underway that end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility and reinforce a whole of government effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While several key developments have emerged since I last testified, in particular the global economic crisis, the three strategic priorities for our military that I outlined last year remain valid. First, we must continue to improve stability and defend our vital national interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia. Second, we must continue efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed Forces. Third, we must continue to balance global strategic risks in a manner that enables us to deter conflict and be prepared for future conflicts. The three strategic priorities are underpinned by the concept of persistent engagement, which supports

allies and partners through programs abroad and at home and which must be led by and conducted hand-in-hand with our interagency partners to achieve sustainable results.

#### KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Over the past year your Armed Forces continued to shoulder a heavy burden worldwide, particularly in the Middle East and South Central Asia. Our emphasis has rightfully remained on the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and against al-Qaeda extremists, though we remain ready to face other global challenges.

Per the President's guidance on February 27th, we will end our combat mission in Iraq by August 31, 2010. The Joint Chiefs and I believe this is a prudent course given the sustained security gains we have seen to date and Iraq's positive trajectory. This current plan preserves flexibility through early 2010 by conducting the majority of the drawdown after the Iraqi election period. In the meantime, our troops are on course to be out of Iraqi cities by June of this year and two more brigades will return to the United States without replacement by the end of September. Drawing down in Iraq is not without risks. Lingering political tensions remain and violence could flare from time to time. Assuming no major surprises, however, we will successfully transition fully to the advise and assist mission over the next 16 months and lay the groundwork for a continued partnership with Iraq that promotes security in the region.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan we are providing additional resources to address the increase in violence. The strategic goal as outlined by the President on March 27, 2009, is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country. As that strategy was being developed, we began responding to conditions on the ground by reinforcing the International Security and Assistance Force commander with some 17,700 troops, the majority of which will arrive by this summer. Our aim in Afghanistan is to check the momentum of the insurgency, train additional forces, and ensure security for the Afghan national elections in August, while in Pakistan we will work with the Pakistani military to further develop their counterinsurgency skills and build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels.

We will shift the main effort from Iraq to Afghanistan in the coming year, though our residual footprint in Iraq will remain larger than in Afghanistan until well into 2010. The strategic environment we face beyond these ongoing conflicts is uncertain and complex. In the near term, we will maintain focus on threats to our vital national interests and our forces directly in harm's way. Increasingly, the greatest mid-term military threats will come from transnational concerns—the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, transnational terrorism, competition over energy, water, and other vital resources, natural disasters and pandemics, climate change, and space vulnerabilities.

A prominent aspect of this shifting strategic environment is the disturbing trend in cyber attacks, where we face both state and non-State actors. Cyberspace is a borderless domain wherein we operate simultaneously with other U.S. Government agencies, allies, and adversaries. Effectiveness is increasingly defined by how well we share information, leverage technology, and capitalize on the strength of others. When appropriate, DOD will lead. Likewise, when appropriate, DOD will provide support and ensure collective success. Our national security and that of our allies is paramount.

A critical new challenge has been added to the strategic environment—the global economic crisis. Although we do not fully understand the impact or depth of this worldwide recession, dire economic conditions increase the pressures for protectionism. They also staunch the flow of remittances, which provide enormous benefits to developing nations. Prolonged downturns can generate internal strife, authoritarian rule, virulent nationalism, manufactured crises, and state conflict. Decreased energy prices have also affected the global economy, on one hand reducing the resources available to some malicious actors, but on the other hand hurting some key allies. Any conflict involving a major energy producer, however, could escalate prices rapidly, which would undoubtedly hamper prospects for a quicker global recovery. Economic concerns will increasingly be the lens through which we—and our partners and competitors—filter security considerations. Many nations may decrease expenditures on defense and foreign assistance, thus making smaller the pool of collective resources with which we have to address challenges. We will work through our routine military-to-military contacts to address this tendency directly and help to coordinate priorities, emphasizing that we are all bound together in this global economy.



Winning our Nation's current and future wars requires concurrent efforts to restore the vitality of the Armed Forces and balance global risk. I am grateful for Congress's continued support of the programs designed to return our units to the desired levels of readiness and for the honest debate engendered in these chambers to ascertain national interests and determine the best mix of capabilities and programs to protect those interests. The ability to debate these national choices—openly and transparently—is just one of the attractive features of our Republic that others seek to emulate.

Our military remains capable of protecting our vital national interests. At the same time, the strain on our people and equipment from more than 7 years of war has been tremendous. There is no tangible "peace dividend" on the horizon given the global commitments of the United States. We still face elevated levels of military risk associated with generating additional ground forces for another contingency should one arise. I do not expect the stress on our people to ease significantly in the near-term given operations in the Middle East, the strategic risk associated with continued regional instability in South Central Asia, and the uncertainty that exists globally. Over the next 2 years the number of forces deployed will remain high. The numbers will reduce, but at a gradual pace. The drawdown in Iraq is weighted in 2010, with the bulk of the combat brigades coming out after the Iraqi elections. At the same time, through the course of 2009 and into 2010, we will be reinforcing the effort in Afghanistan. Only in 2011 can we expect to see marked improvements in the dwell time of our ground forces.

We cannot—and do not—face these global challenges alone. We benefit greatly from networks of partners and allies. Despite the economic downturn, the bulk of the world's wealth and the majority of the world's most capable militaries are found in those nations we call friends. Persistent engagement maintains these partnerships and lays the foundation upon which to build effective, collective action in times of security and economic crisis. In the coming years we must be careful not to shunt aside the steady work required to sustain these ties. By maintaining regional security partnerships, developing and expanding effective information sharing networks, and continuing military-to-military outreach, we improve the ability to monitor the drivers of conflict and help position our Nation for engagement rather than reaction. Such engagement also propels us toward the common good, relieves some of the burden on our forces, improves the protection of the homeland, and helps secure U.S. vital national interests.

#### DEFEND VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA

Given its strategic importance and our vital national interests, the United States will continue to engage in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia—as a commitment to friends and allies, as a catalyst for cooperative action against violent extremism, as a deterrent against state aggression, as an honest broker in conflict resolution, and as a guarantor of access to natural resources. Yet we recognize that our presence in these regions can be more productive with a lower profile. The Iraq drawdown is the first step on the path to that end.

Attaining our goals in these critical regions requires time, resources, and endurance. Most of the challenges in the region are not military in nature and can only be met successfully from within. Our role remains one essentially of consistent, transparent partnership building. These actions send an unmistakable message to all that the United States remains committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of partnerships available to address future challenges.

Central to these efforts in the Middle East and South Central Asia will be the relentless pressure we maintain on al-Qaeda and its senior leadership. Al-Qaeda's narrative will increasingly be exposed as corrupt and self-limiting. Though too many disaffected young men still fall prey to al-Qaeda's exploitation, I believe the populations in the region will ultimately reject what al-Qaeda offers. Our priority effort will remain against al-Qaeda, but we will also take preventative measures against the spread of like-minded violent extremist organizations and their ideologies to neighboring regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The U.S. military's task is to partner with affected nations to combat terrorism, counter violent extremism, and build their capacity to shoulder this same burden.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are central fronts in the fight against al-Qaeda and militant global extremism and must be understood in relation to each other. Afghanistan requires additional resources to counter a growing insurgency partially fed by safe havens and support networks located within Pakistan. Additional U.S. troops will conduct counterinsurgency operations to enhance population security against the Taliban in south/southwest Afghanistan and to accelerate and improve training

and mentoring of Afghan security forces. As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. We must make every effort to eliminate civilian casualties, not only because this is the right thing to do but also because it deprives the Taliban of a propaganda tool that exploits Afghan casualties and calls into question U.S./NATO endurance and effectiveness in providing security. Although we must expect higher Alliance casualties as we go after the insurgents, their sanctuaries, and their sources of support, our extended security presence must—and will—ultimately protect the Afghan people and limit both civilian and military casualties. Our troops will integrate closely with Afghan forces, with the objective of building Afghan security forces that are capable of assuming responsibility for their country's security.

We expect the reinforcements to have the most pronounced effect over the next 12–24 months. Security gains can only be assured when complemented by development and governance programs designed to build greater self sufficiency over time. Our commanders in the field can lay some of this groundwork through the proven Commanders Emergency Response Program to start smaller projects quickly, but these projects can not compensate for the larger, enduring programs required. A temporary boost in security that is not matched with commensurate political and economic development will not only fail to generate faith in the Afghan government and fail to convince Afghans of our commitment, but also fail to accomplish our objectives. Over time, these objectives will be met more through civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations, with a lighter military presence. Getting to that point, however, requires that military forces generate the security required for political and economic initiatives to take root.

Pakistan is crucial to our success in Afghanistan. In my nine trips to Pakistan, I've developed a deeper understanding of how important it is that we, as a Nation, make and demonstrate a long term commitment to sustaining this partnership. We are taking multiple approaches to rebuild and strengthen relationships and address threats common to both of our nations. One key approach in the near term is to help Pakistan's military to improve its overall—and specifically its counterinsurgency—capabilities. Beyond the trainers we will continue to provide, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and Coalition Support Funds provide us the means to address this issue directly, and I ask the Congress to support these initiatives and provide the flexibility to accelerate their implementation. We are committed to comprehensive accountability measures to ensure that these funds go exactly where they are intended to go and do not compromise other USG humanitarian assistance objectives. These programs will help the Pakistanis take continued action to combat extremist threats in western Pakistani territories which will complement the reinforcement of troops and special operations efforts in Afghanistan to maintain pressure on al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. In addition to these initiatives, steady support of the Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing programs will help us to address the needs expressed by Pakistan's leaders and validated by our civil-military leadership. We will also be well served by the substantially larger request for International Military Education and Training exchanges with Pakistan, to help reconnect our institutions and forge lasting relationships. Military programs must also be supplemented by non-military investment and continued engagement, which further confirm our Nation's long term commitment.

In all, we must recognize the limits of what can be accomplished at what price and at what pace in both countries. This will be a long campaign. We are committed to providing sustained, substantial commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be halting and gradual, but we can steadily reduce the threats to our Nation that emanate from conditions in those countries.

In Iraq, we are on the path to stability and long-term partnership as codified in the Security Agreement. Political, ethnic, and sectarian tensions may continue to surface in sporadic bouts of violence. But we also expect that Iraq's Security Forces will continue to improve, malign Iranian influence will not escalate, and, although resilient, al-Qaeda in Iraq will not be able to regroup and reestablish the control it once had. I am heartened by the conduct of Iraq's provincial elections in January and the election of a new Speaker of the Council of Representatives and expect additional political progress in the coming year.

The drawdown in Iraq carries inherent risks. But the plan that is underway provides sufficient flexibility for the ground commander to adjust to Iraqi political and security developments and to deal with the unexpected. We are currently working with Multi-National Force-Iraq, CENTCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and the Services on the mechanics of the drawdown and the composition of the roughly 35,000-to 50,000-strong transition force provided for in the Status of Forces Agreement that will remain in Iraq after August 31, 2010, to advise and assist the Iraqi Security

Forces, conduct counter terrorism operations, and provide force protection to civilian agencies.

The Iranian government's sponsorship of violent surrogates and failure to improve the confidence of the international community in the intent of its nuclear program, contribute to instability in the broader Middle East. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force orchestrates the activities of its proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan, across the Levant, and beyond. Through these proxies, Iran inserts itself into the Israeli-Palestinian situation and Lebanese internal politics by its direct support of Hamas and Hizballah. Iran's continued failure to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions and cooperate fully with the IAEA cast doubt on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Our allies in the region share our deep concerns about Iran's nuclear policies, which if unchecked could lead to further regional proliferation as other States would seek nuclear weapons as a hedge—an outcome that would serve neither Iran nor the region. Iran could be an immensely constructive actor in the region, and its choices in the near term will have far reaching consequences. As the administration pursues diplomacy with Iran to address these serious concerns, we will continue to work with the international community to convince Iran to comply with its international obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Al-Qaeda has expressed the desire for WMD and its intent to strike the homeland is undisputed. Al-Qaeda would also likely use WMD against populations in the broader Middle East. Consequently, the nexus between violent extremism and the proliferation of WMD remains a grave threat to the United States and our vital national interests. The defeat of al-Qaeda would significantly diminish the threat from this nexus, but does not fully remove it given the conceptual blueprint already established for other extremists. We will continue to support national efforts to counter, limit, and contain WMD proliferation from both hostile state and non-State actors. We will also team with partners inside and outside the broader Middle East to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen regional governments' confidence that we can address the WMD threat. But we must recognize that this threat requires vigilance for the duration, given the magnitude of damage that can be wrought by even a single incident.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular the violence in Gaza in from Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in late December 2008 and January 2009, continues to cast a pall across the region. The Peace Process is primarily a diplomatic endeavor, but one we support fully through such initiatives as the training and advising of legitimate Palestinian security forces, exchanges with Israeli counterparts, and cooperation with Arab military partners. These initiatives support broader national endeavors aimed at a reduction in violence, greater stability, and peaceful co-existence in this critical region.

#### RESET, RECONSTITUTE, AND REVITALIZE THE ARMED FORCES

Protecting our Nation's interests in recent years has required the significant commitment of U.S. military forces. Indeed, extensive security tasks remain before us as we pursue the stated objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, defeat the al-Qaeda network, prevent the spread of WMD, deter conflict, preserve our ability to project and sustain military power at global distances, and maintain persistent engagement with allies and partners around the globe. At the core of our ability to accomplish all of these tasks are the talented, trained, and well-equipped members of the Armed Forces. I remain convinced that investment in our people is the best investment you make on behalf of our citizens.

The pace of current commitments has prevented our forces from fully training for the entire spectrum of operations. Consequently, readiness to address the range of threats that might emerge has declined. The demands we have put on our people and equipment over the past 7 years are unsustainable over the long-term. As we continue to institutionalize proficiency in irregular warfare, we must also restore the balance and strategic depth required to ensure national security. Continued operations that are not matched with appropriate national resources will further degrade equipment, platforms, and, most importantly, our people.

Our Nation's service members and their families are at the core of my efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our forces. Every decision I make takes into consideration their well-being. The All-Volunteer Force has accomplished every mission it has been given, but at a high price. I do not take their service for granted and recognize the limits of their endurance. I remain extremely concerned about the toll the current pace of operations is taking on them and on our ability to respond to crises and contingencies beyond ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The dwell time of units is one key metric we watch closely for the Army and Marine Corps. Dwell time remains at approximately 1:1 for ground units, meaning 1 year deployed and 1 year at home for the Army, 7 months deployed/7 months at home for the Marine Corps, and similar cycles for the Airmen and Sailors serving in joint expeditionary taskings. Dwell time will improve, but we cannot expect it to return to an interim 1:2 or the desired 1:3 or better for several years given the number of ground forces still tasked with re-posturing to Afghanistan, the advise and assist mission in Iraq after drawdown, and other global commitments. Special Operations Forces (SOF) face similar deployment cycles but improvements in their dwell time will lag the Army and Marine Corps given the demand for SOF expertise in the irregular warfare environment we face. A key part of the effort to improve dwell time is the continued commitment to the size of the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces as reflected in the 2010 budget. Institution of the "Grow the Force" initiative is an indispensable element of the long-term plan to restore readiness.

Our recruiters met the missions of their military departments for fiscal year 2008 and are well on track for fiscal year 2009. The Services have been able to reduce the number of conduct waivers issued and the Army in the recruiting year to date has seen a marked increase in the number of high school graduates joining its ranks, exceeding the Department of Defense Tier 1 Educational Credential Standard of 90 percent for all three Army components—Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. Retaining combat-proven leaders and the people with the skills we need is just as important. The Services have benefited from the full range of authorities given to them by Congress as retention incentives. I ask for your continued support of these programs, in particular the bonuses used by the Services to retain key mid-career active duty officers and enlisted. I also ask for your continued support of incentives for Reserve and National Guard service to provide flexibility and enhanced retirement benefits. We have made important strides in the past year in equipping these vital members of the Total Force, and their performance over the past 7 years of war has been superb. Economic conditions will ameliorate some of the recruiting and retention pressure in the coming year, but we must recognize that personnel costs will continue to grow as we debate the national level of investment in defense.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have spent the last 18 months meeting with Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilian public servants. In them I recognize the differences in our generations, with the younger ones ever more comfortable with social networking and technology. Yet I recognize in all of them a strong thread of continuity that stretches back to the Nation's beginnings. That thread is a keen awareness of how they and their influencers—parents, teachers, coaches, and peers—perceive the manner in which today's veterans are treated. Service members know that the American people stand fully behind them, regardless of varying opinions over American policy. The All-Volunteer Force has earned this trust and confidence. This contract must be renewed every day with the American people, who can never doubt that we will be good stewards of their most precious investment in their armed forces—the sons and daughters who serve our Nation.

Emblematic of that stewardship is the way we treat returning Wounded Warriors and the parents, spouses and family members who support them. As a Nation, we have an enduring obligation to those who have shouldered the load and who bear the visible and invisible scars of war, some of whom we unfortunately find in the ranks of the homeless. As leaders, we must ensure that all Wounded Warriors and their families receive the care, training, and financial support they need to become self-sufficient and lead as normal a life as possible—a continuum of care that lasts for life. This continuum extends especially to the families of the fallen. Our focus must be more on commitment rather than compensations, and on transition and ability rather than disability. To the degree that we fail to care for them and their families, and enable their return to as normal a life as possible, we undermine the trust and confidence of the American people.

One other area that has been particularly troubling since I last testified is the rise in the number of service member suicides. The Army in particular has been hit hard by a troubling increase over the past 4 years and an already disturbing number of suicides in 2009. We do not know precisely why this is occurring, though the increased stress of wartime is certainly a factor. All Service leaders are looking hard at the problem, to include ensuring that we make a service member's ability to seek mental health care both unimpeded and stigma free. This approach requires a cultural change in all of the Services that will take time to inculcate, but the seeds are planted and taking root. The program at Fort Hood, Texas, is just one example of how a commander-empowered that understands the problem as a result of stress

rather than weakness and incorporates families can sharply reduce the number of suicides in a specific community.

The Department and the Services have also continued to expand comprehensive programs designed to prevent sexual abuse in the military. Such abuse is intolerable and an unacceptable betrayal of trust. We will continue work towards the goal of eliminating this crime from our ranks.

Although the strain on our people is most acute, the strain on equipment and platforms is likewise significant. Through the reconstitution effort over the next decade, we will repair, rebuild, and replace the equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, and worn out beyond repair after years of combat operations. As Congress is well aware, Service equipment has been used at higher rates under harsher conditions than anticipated. The drawdown in Iraq through the end of next summer will provide us even greater first-hand insight into the state of ground force equipment as we retrograde multiple brigade combat team and enabler sets.

Beyond the wear and tear experienced by ground vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan, our airframes are aging beyond their intended service lives. Indeed since Desert Storm, 18 years ago, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have flown near continuous combat missions over the Middle East and the Balkans with the F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s that were designed in the 1960s and 1970s and which, with upgrades, have proven their worth repeatedly over time. We have struggled with a wide variety of airframes, as seen in the fleet-wide groundings of all major fighter weapons systems at various times over the past 5 years, the strains on 30-year-old P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft, and ongoing efforts to retire some of our C-130 Hercules and KC-135 Strato-tankers. Maintaining and acquiring sufficiently robust air and naval forces remain pressing requirements as these assets are central to ensuring the command of the sea and air that enables all operations. To help pay for these pressing requirements we must continue to look towards acquisition transformation that supports accelerated fielding of equipment before the speed of technology eclipses its value. We also need to reduce stove-piped Information Technology service solutions and replace them wherever possible with joint enterprise solutions and capabilities that are more effective at reduced costs.

Our forces have relied upon the funds appropriated in the fiscal year 2009 budget request to accomplish equipment reset and to address readiness shortfalls. Congress's continued support is necessary for the predictable, adequate funding required for the repair and replacement of both operational and training equipment. I ask for your continued support for the upcoming fiscal year 2010 funding request. I fully support the vision Secretary Gates has laid out—and which the President has endorsed and forwarded—for the Department and the joint force. This vision and its program decisions emphasize our people first. Our advanced technology, superior weapons systems, and proven doctrine won't produce effective organizations absent quality men and women. These decisions also balance our efforts by addressing the fights we are in and most likely to encounter again without sacrificing conventional capability. That balance helps to check programs that have exceeded their original design, improve efficiency, and steward the resources taxpayers provide us for the common defense. The holistic changes we are making work in combination with one another and span the joint force. I am confident that they not only preserve our war fighting edge but also inject the flexibility required to address today's most relevant challenges.

An area of particular interest is energy—which is essential to military operations. Our in-theater fuel demand has the potential to constrain our operational flexibility and increase the vulnerability of our forces. Thus your Armed Forces continue to seek innovative ways to enhance operational effectiveness by reducing total force energy demands. We are also looking to improve energy security by institutionalizing energy considerations in our business processes, establishing energy efficiency and sustainability metrics, and increasing the availability of alternative sources.

The ongoing revitalization of the joint force makes our conventional deterrent more credible, which helps prevent future wars while winning the wars we are now fighting. Restoring our forces is an investment in security—one which is hard in tough economic times—but one that is required in an exceedingly uncertain and complex security environment. Understanding that environment and having forces capable of the full range of military operations is central to balancing global strategic risk.

#### BALANCING GLOBAL STRATEGIC RISK

My third priority of balancing global strategic risk is aimed at the core functions of our military—to protect the homeland, deter conflict, and be prepared to defeat enemies. Each function is tied to today's conflicts and each requires continuous at-

tention. Successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and improved partnership with Pakistan will take us far in the fight against al-Qaeda, although the network has spread tentacles across Asia, Africa, and Europe that we will continue to attack. These campaigns have two functions: first, deterring future conflict, and second, staying prepared by building networks of capable partners who help us see conflict brewing and are ready to stand with us if prevention fails. These functions help to protect and secure the global commons: sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Increasingly, we are encountering more security challenges to these nodes and networks of global commerce. In cyberspace, we are continuing proactive steps to pursue effective organizational constructs and to reshape attitudes, roles, and responsibilities; we must increasingly see our information systems as war fighting tools equal in necessity to tanks, aircraft, ships, and other weapon systems. The Nation must work to increase the security of all vital government and commercial internet domains and improve coordination between all U.S. Government agencies and appropriate private sectors. One related step in strengthening the military's operations in the commons that I continue to support is the United States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. This Convention provides a stable legal regime by reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, ensuring unimpeded transit passage through international straits, and providing a framework to counter excessive claims of other States.

We must be sized, shaped, and postured globally to detect, deter, and confront the threats of the future. At the same time we must leverage the opportunities for international cooperation while building the capacity of partners for stability. These capacity building efforts are investments, with small amounts of manpower and resources, which can, over time, reduce the need to commit U.S. forces. I recognize, as do the Combatant Commanders, that our ability to do so is constrained by ongoing operations, but that does not make building partner capacity any less important. We can magnify the peaceful effects we seek by helping emerging powers become constructive actors in the international system. Fostering closer international cooperation, particularly in today's distressed economic climate, is one method of preventing nations from turning inward or spiraling into conflict and disorder.

The wars we are fighting limit our capacity to respond to future contingencies and preclude robust global partnership building programs. While necessary, our focus on the current mission also offers potential adversaries, both state and non-State, incentives to act. We must not allow today's technological and organizational arrangements to impede our preparation for tomorrow's challenges, which include irregular, traditional and cyber warfare. In cyberspace, one often overlooked challenge is the need for military forces to maintain access to and freedom of action in this global domain. Our command and control and most sensitive information are constantly threatened by intrusion, interruption, and exploitation efforts. We must understand these risks in the context of the combined arms fight and carefully weigh their effects on our national security and global missions. This is true for the military as well as our Nation's public and private sector cyberspace. In all, we continue to mitigate the risk we face in the ability to respond rapidly to other contingencies through a variety of measures. Restoring balance to our forces, however, remains the principal mitigation necessary for the long-term.

Enduring alliances and partnerships extend our reach. In each relationship we remain wedded to this Nation's principles which respect human rights and adhere to the rule of law. The 28-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, designed for a far different mission decades ago, has proven adaptive to the times and now leads the security and stability mission in Afghanistan. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan have made key contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner. We seek to mature this partnership and address common security challenges globally as well as within the region. Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines continue to work with us to counter international terrorist threats in Southeast Asia while Thailand remains a significant partner in supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster response in South and Southeast Asia. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership has worked to counter transnational terrorist threats in north and west Africa, and cooperative efforts with the Gulf of Guinea nations has generated improvements in maritime security against piracy, illegal trafficking, and overfishing off Africa's west coast. Multinational efforts in the Gulf of Aden are helping stem the unwanted scourge of piracy emanating from Somalia, though much work remains to be done. Colombia continues a successful counterinsurgency campaign in the Andean Ridge that reflects the patient, steady partnership between our nations, and we are particularly grateful for the Colombian Armed Forces' impressive rescue of three Americans held in FARC captivity last July. Military-to-military relationships with Mexico and Canada help to improve homeland security. In the

coming year, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, we will work to improve cooperation with Mexico via training, resources, and intelligence sharing as Mexico takes on increased drug-related violence. The examples above represent far broader efforts and partially illuminate how enhancing teamwork with allies and partners helps to protect our shared interests. The interdependency of nations should not be allowed to unravel under economic duress, and these security focused programs are one way of reinforcing beneficial ties that bind.

We also seek to further cooperation with States not in our formal alliances. We have established relationships with the nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia to build a transportation network in support of our efforts in Afghanistan. We recognize the key role Russia plays and are encouraged by Russian assistance with this project. There is more we can do together to bring peace and security to the people of Afghanistan. At the same time, we are troubled by the Russian-Georgian conflict last August and while we acknowledge Russia's security concerns, its actions created a more difficult international situation and damaged its relationship with NATO and the United States. We look forward to resuming military-to-military engagement, as part of our broader relationship, in a manner that builds confidence, enhances transparency, and rights the path towards cooperation.

We likewise seek to continue improved relations with China, which is each year becoming a more important trading partner of the United States. We acknowledge the positive trends in our bilateral relations with China even as we maintain our capabilities to meet commitments in the region, given the security and stability that credible U.S. power has promoted in the western Pacific for over 60 years. We seek common understanding on issues of mutual concern but must recognize China's unmistakable and growing strength in technological, naval, and air capabilities, and this growth's effect on China's neighbors. While we are concerned over events such as the confrontation between U.S.N.S. *Impeccable* and Chinese vessels, we support China's growing role as a regional and global partner. I believe both governments can synchronize common interests in the Pacific. Key among these interests are continued joint efforts aimed at reducing the chance of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the return of North Korea to the Six Party Talks. This is particularly true given North Korea's recent nuclear test and continued testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the face of United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanding that it halt nuclear tests or launch of ballistic missiles.

Rebalancing strategic risk also means addressing capability gaps. Our Nation's cyber vulnerabilities could have devastating ramifications to our national security interests. Interruption of access to cyberspace, whether in the public or private sectors, has the potential to substantively damage national security. We cannot conduct effective military operations without freedom of action in cyberspace. Addressing this threat, the President's budget for fiscal year 2010 includes funds to reduce cyber vulnerabilities and to close some of the operational and policy seams between military, government, and commercial Internet domains. Likewise, and related to maintaining a secure global information grid, freedom of action in Space remains vital to our economic, civil, and military well-being. We need to ensure access to cyberspace and Space as surely as we must have access to the sea and air lanes of the global commons. We must also balance the needs of the Combatant Commanders in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance sensors and processing infrastructure that are proving ever more crucial in missions that span the globe.

Fighting and winning wars will always be the military's most visible mission. Preventing wars through deterrence, however, is preferable. In our strategic deterrence mission, deterring nuclear threats is most crucial. Our Nation remains engaged in many vital efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and reduce global stockpiles through international agreements and support activities. Still, many States and non-State actors have or actively seek these weapons. To preserve a credible deterrent we will need safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons, an effective infrastructure to sustain that enterprise, and skilled people to support it. In addition, as our strategic deterrence calculus expands to address new and varied threats, proven missile defense capabilities will remain essential as tools to deter, dissuade and assure in an environment of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation.

#### PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT

Our vital national interests call for a wise, long-term investment in global persistent engagement. For military forces, persistent engagement requires successfully conducting ongoing stability operations and building capacity with allies and partners. These efforts range from advising defense ministries to training host nation forces to conducting joint exercises to sharing intelligence to exchanging professional students. Over time, such actions help to provide the basic level of security from

which economic development, representative political institutions, and diplomatic initiatives can take permanent root. Persistent engagement demonstrates enduring U.S. commitment, though, importantly, this commitment must be tempered with humility and a realistic assessment of the limits of our influence. The goal is always to empower partners, who are ultimately the only ones who can achieve lasting results.

During my travels, I've developed a more comprehensive appreciation of the value that personal relationships, fostered over time, bring to our security endeavors. At the senior level, these relationships provide insight and alert us to signals we might have otherwise missed, as such, providing us warning of conflict which can then be used to head off a brewing storm in some cases. These relationships should not be limited to just senior leaders. Rather, they should be developed throughout the careers of our officers and their partner nation colleagues. Such sustained cooperation builds a network of military-to-military contacts that ultimately provides avenues to defuse crises, assure access, institutionalize cooperation, and address common threats.

As I noted in particular with Pakistan, the criticality of "mil-to-mil" exchanges, combined exercises, schoolhouse visits, professional education collaboration, and many other programs are all part of the robust outreach we require. In particular, I ask that the Congress fully fund the Department of State's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and Global Train and Equip Programs, which the Departments of State and Defense jointly manage. While many militaries around the world clamor to train with us, we reap far more than the costs of these programs in terms of personal, sustained relationships. These relationships help us bridge difficult political situations by tapping into trust developed over the course of years. I cannot overemphasize the importance of these programs. They require only small amounts of funding and time for long term return on investment that broadly benefits the United States.

I endorse a similar approach for and with our interagency partners, and I fully support the building of a Civilian Response Corps. Achieving the objectives of any campaign requires increased emphasis not only on fully developing and resourcing the capacity of other U.S. agencies (State, USAID, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce and so forth), but also on increasing our Nation's ability to build similar interagency capacities with foreign partners.

#### CONCLUSION

In providing my best military advice over the past 18 months, one important point I have made, consonant with Secretary Gates, is that our military activities must support rather than lead our Nation's foreign policy. Our war fighting ability will never be in doubt. But we have learned from the past 7 years of war that we serve this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated approach that employs all elements of power to achieve the policy goals set by our civilian leaders. To this end, I believe we should fully fund the State Department as the lead agent of U.S. diplomacy and development, an action that would undoubtedly resonate globally. This approach obviously requires the backing of a robust military and a strong economy. As we win the wars we are fighting and restore the health of our Armed Forces, the military's approach will increasingly support our diplomatic counterparts through the persistent engagement required to build networks of capable partners. By operating globally, hand-in-hand with partners and integrated with the interagency and non-governmental organizations, we will more successfully protect the citizens of this Nation.

On behalf of our service members, I would like to thank Congress for the sustained investment in them and for your unwavering support in time of war.

#### ACQUISITION REFORM

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Under Secretary?

If I may now begin my questioning. Mr. Secretary, our troops entered Afghanistan in 2001 and our troops entered Iraq in 2003 and we soon learned that it wasn't what we expected and in some ways we weren't quite prepared. So we rapidly developed platforms like the MRAP and the anti-improvised explosive device (IED) mines. Now, why was it necessary to go outside the regular DOD acquisition process to get these things? And how can we institutionalize



these activities instead of continually adding layers of new bureaucracy?

Secretary GATES. We've had to go outside the regular bureaucracy, I think, in four major areas, one before I became Secretary and three subsequently. The first, that was formed before I became Secretary, was the effort to counter the IEDs, as you suggest. The subsequent ones have been for dealing with wounded warriors, for building the MRAPs, and for greater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance needs.

The problem is that there were too few people that came to work in the Pentagon every day asking, what can I do today to help our warfighters succeed and come home safely. So we needed to go outside the regular procurement processes, because frankly without the top-down direction from the Secretary of Defense these efforts would not have been successful.

In the case of the MRAPs, it required using a number of authorities provided by law only to the Secretary of Defense in terms of acquisition of materials and priorities and so on. But in other cases the solution was across multiple services and outside the normal bureaucratic structure.

I believe that the services are changing the way they do business. For example, the Air Force just in the last year or so under General Schwartz's leadership has taken on board the significance of the ISR challenge and the need to have significantly larger numbers of pilots who can pilot, who can run these UAVs and so on. So the services I think are beginning to embrace the needs of the current warfighter and provide for them.

Frankly, the reason for my putting a number of these things into the base budget is because that's where the services draw the resources to be able to go ahead and pursue these programs. For example, the ISR Task Force, my anticipation is that it will disappear, and one of the challenges that I've had is keeping it focused on what can we do in the next 2 or 3 months to help get more ISR capabilities into the field. The natural bureaucratic propensity has been to try and squeeze, because I'm paying attention to that task force, to try and squeeze all kinds of new long-term programs that'll take years and so on into it. So we've had to be very disciplined about keeping it focused on the near term while the longer term issues are taken care of in the regular bureaucracy.

But I'm satisfied enough with the progress that the Air Force and the Army are making in the ISR area that I believe this task force can go away. The truth of the matter is, in the case of the MRAPs, had it not been for the generosity of the Congress and the American people, we never could have built the MRAPs. As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, we built and deployed some 16,000 of these. We are now developing a new kind of MRAP for Afghanistan. But the total cost of that program to date has been about \$26 billion. If we had tried to carve \$26 billion out of the current Pentagon budget, there would have been a real blood-letting. So the only way we were able to do the MRAPs was through the special funding from the Congress.

What I am trying to do is to bring about a change in the culture of the Pentagon so we can, as I described it in another hearing,

walk and chew gum at the same time, so that we can energetically and with a sense of urgency deal with the wars we are in and at the same time plan for the future wars, which, as you rightfully suggested, we have to be prepared to fight.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Admiral Mullen, many have described the acquisition process in DOD to be cumbersome and inflexible because we tend to seek the perfect solution. It takes many years to do this. But for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we, as the Secretary pointed out, we have expedited the process, maybe not seeking 100 percent, but going for 75. My question to you as a leader of troops: Do you believe that we are meeting the needs of warfighters?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. If I were to use the task force analogy just briefly, because I've been in this building, in and out, but in certainly in the last decade or so for a long time, I just think it takes the kind of leadership focus that has been offered in those to create the sense of urgency, to constantly update the guidance so the system does not take off by itself.

It is really in those areas that the Secretary and you have talked—in addition, the equipment, the personal equipment for our warfighters, which all of us have taken a great interest in, and service chiefs certainly lead that as well. So from an equipment standpoint, absolutely. That doesn't mean that we won't continue to advance in some of these areas, because we still need more capability in terms of capacity. ISR would be a great example.

I also, having participated in this acquisition for a long period of time, think we don't move swiftly, with the sense of urgency and the speed, and we do look too far out to meet the current needs. I've seen the kind of focus that these task forces have created and the leadership that's on top of them be able to do that. I just don't believe our system could have done that.

I do think they need to at some point in time sunset, have a sunset clause, set the criteria out there to be absorbed in the system. As the Secretary has indicated, that's the case for the ISR Task Force.

So I am confident we have the equipment we need. We also need to stay focused as the enemy changes to ensure that we stay ahead of the enemy as he changes his tactics.

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, let me add one more example of, frankly, where we, the Chairman and I, have to fight the inertia of the Department on a daily basis. One of the things that we've been trying to do this spring—this goes to Senator Leahy's point about his troops going to Afghanistan—is drive the medevac time, the time required for medevac, from 2 hours down to the same golden hour that exists in Iraq.

We've made some substantial headway in this. We're now on average at about 68 minutes and many are much faster. I sent a number of additional resources forward from the Air Force and the Army earlier this spring, including three additional field hospitals. But the sad reality is that without the Chairman and I paying attention to this almost daily, getting it done and getting it done in a timely manner is just a real challenge.

## BUDGET RATIONALE

So at the end of the day I'm not sure that there is a permanent bureaucratic fix, but what it does take is the focus of the leadership on what's important. And that priority in my view, when we are at war is taking care of those who are at war.

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary, you suggested about 10 percent of this budget will be for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for conventional, strategic, traditional warfare, and 40 percent for dual use. How did you divide it up in that fashion?

Secretary GATES. Well, actually those numbers came after the fact, Mr. Chairman. I made the decisions on each of the program areas independently and in the context of each other from a strategic standpoint and capabilities standpoint. It was only after I had made all the decisions that, frankly, the guys who manage the money told me that that was about how the breakout of the percentages worked. So it basically was a recognition of a reality that was formed by the decisions that had already been made. I didn't go into it with the goal of shifting  $x$  dollars.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman.

## MRAP VEHICLES

I appreciate your mentioning the MRAP vehicles, the vehicles that have been used in Afghanistan. I wonder about whether the budget requests funding for the new all-terrain vehicle (ATV) as well, the M-ATV as it's now referred to. Will that be useful in Afghanistan or do you foresee other uses of those vehicles besides in our efforts to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan?

Secretary GATES. They're primarily being designed for use in Afghanistan, where the extraordinary weight of the regular MRAPs we've designed for Iraq sometimes limits their usefulness off road. So what we have done in the all-terrain MRAP is to try and provide essentially the same level of protection, but with a different design that will give it more capability off road. There is money in the budget, both in the overseas contingency operation funds and also in the base budget, that will fund most of the requirement for the all-terrain vehicles. The requirement has been growing since we submitted the budget, and so I don't think that there's enough money in the budget to buy all of those needed to meet the requirement, but a substantial number. In fact, Mr. Hale can give you the exact numbers.

Mr. HALE. We have 1,000 MRAP ATVs in the 2009 remaining supplemental and 1,080 in the fiscal 2010 OCOA. I believe Congress is adding some to the fiscal 2009 supplemental.

Senator COCHRAN. In connection with ship requirements, we've noticed the increase in the amphibious ship fleet needs that go beyond traditional military missions. The tsunamis, the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, led the military to contribute ships, some aircraft carrier capabilities, for humanitarian relief and providing food and medical supplies to these areas that were hard-hit.

Do you see a continuing need for shipbuilding in the amphibious area because of the willingness to use those vessels for nontraditional missions?

#### NAVAL ISSUES

Secretary GATES. This is one of the issues where I did not make any significant decisions, because I didn't feel that I had the analytical basis to do so. So one of the subjects that the Quadrennial Defense Review is addressing is the role of amphibious capability going forward, and not whether we need it, but how much we need. So that will be one of the areas of the QDR where I will be looking for some analytical guidance.

But it's clear that those capabilities range far beyond the kind of armed intrusiveness or the armed intervention that was the original design purpose.

#### MISSILE DEFENSE

Senator COCHRAN. The activity we've noticed with concern in North Korea in the recent short-range missile testing has led to concerns about whether or not we are moving fast enough with a ground-based interceptor production line. What is the impression that you have about the request in this budget as it relates to our capacity to defend ourselves against what looks to be an emerging and a continuing threat from North Korea and maybe others?

Secretary GATES. The ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California clearly are an important element of defense against rogue state launches, and I would say in particular North Korea. I think the judgment and the advice that I got was that the 30 silos that we have now or are under construction are fully adequate to protect us against the North Korean threat for a number of years.

Now, the reality is that if that threat were to begin to develop more quickly than anybody anticipates or in a way that people haven't anticipated, where the 30 interceptors would not look like they were sufficient, it would be very easy to resume this program and expand the number of silos.

I was just in Fort Greeley last week and it's an immensely capable system, and one of the things that I think is important to remember is it is still a developmental system. It has real capabilities and I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.

But one of the things this budget does is robustly fund further development and testing of the interceptors at Fort Greeley and at Vandenberg, so that as new interceptors with new capabilities and that are more sophisticated are developed we will put those into the silos and take the old interceptors out. So the idea is this is not just a static system up in Fort Greeley, but something that is undergoing continuing improvement. If the circumstances should change in a way that leads people to believe that we need more interceptors than the 30, then there's plenty of room at Fort Greeley to expand.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, we thank you and Admiral Mullen and the Department and the soldiers and sailors who carry out your decisions well and continued success as we protect our Nation.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### MRAP ATV

Secretary Gates, I was going to ask some questions about the MRAP ATV, but Senator Cochran and others have. Chairman Inouye has been very helpful on funding on that critical program.

Mr. Hale, you had mentioned the money for it. In the 2009 supplemental budget, we doubled it here in the Senate. We're now in negotiations with the other body of that. I have a particular interest in this. Everybody I've talked with when I was in Afghanistan told me how much they need this for the same reasons that the Secretary described. I heard from the commanding generals to the coalition forces and others.

You know this terrain probably far better than I, but you just look at the terrain—coming from a rural mountainous area myself, I can easily understand why the MRAPs, as great as they are, with their weight, when they go off road, they're just going to tip over. So I hope it will happen.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Incidentally, when we were there we visited the Kabul Military Training Center, Senator Whitehouse, Senator Warner—at that sprawling former Soviet base, where the Afghan National Army go through a kind of basic training. I went to the training courses and saw what they do. The extraordinary high rate of illiteracy among the recruits there has to be a cause of concern. I saw so many of the training things where they were written in their language, but also almost like a comic book showing diagrams of people doing things.

Then I read the article, which I'm sure you've seen, the C.J. Chivers article from the New York Times about the failures, especially in the police force, in the training of the police force, and then in the military and on patrol. One of the things that struck me is when one Afghan insulted the other and they started into a fistfight in the middle of patrol, when you're out in an area where you have to depend on everybody being on their highest level.

That's on the bad side. On the good side, I heard from so many there how they don't see us as occupiers; they see us as people trying to help. They see a country, unlike some of its neighbors, a country probably with the potential of pulling this out, with our help. Our help means a lot of money and, unfortunately, a lot of casualties.

How do you feel? Are we going to have a cohesive, trained Afghan National Army and police force? Because I don't see how we leave until there is one. I mean, you just look at this all the time, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. Let me start and then ask Admiral Mullen to add in. I think our commanders are very optimistic about particu-

larly the Afghan National Army. It is I think at this point perhaps the strongest national institution that exists in Afghanistan, and we are on a path to increase the size from about 82,000 to 134,000.

I think a lot of the problems with the police are being addressed. Part of that problem is the lack of sufficient trainers, and part of the added forces that we're sending in will in fact be for training the police. We have a program where we're going back into districts, pulling the police force out, retraining them, giving them new equipment, and then putting them back in with police mentors. The experience with that program so far has been encouraging. It's still pretty small scale and it needs to be expanded and accelerated, and I hope that the addition of our trainers will be able to do that.

But there's no question but that our ticket out of Afghanistan is the ability of the Afghans to maintain their own security. I think our commanders feel that we're on the right track.

But let me ask Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. I would only echo that, Senator Leahy, from the point of view that these are warriors. They are a warrior nation and they have been in many cases at war over the last 30 years. We share the concern about illiteracy. That said, in my many visits this kind of issue has never routinely raised its head as something that we can't take into account and move forward with.

Senator LEAHY. Would you agree that there is a significant difference between the police and the Army.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, actually not unlike Iraq. In Iraq the army came quicker. It's the same thing in Afghanistan.

Senator LEAHY. But the average person is going to see the police before they're going to see the army in many, many instances in their day to day life.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LEAHY. And if they see bribery and corruption and all that, that's the face of the government. I mean, it's the same in our country. The difference is that we've evolved so most of our police forces are extraordinarily well trained.

Do you feel confident we can turn that around?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I think it's actually Minister of Interior Otmar, and I don't know if you met him.

Senator LEAHY. I did.

Admiral MULLEN. He's a very impressive guy. He understands the problems he has and he's addressing them. It's going to take some time.

This program the Secretary mentioned, which is this focused district development, where they go off to school for 8 or 9 weeks and then return with mentors, is another significant step in the right direction. But it's going to take time, and the police are not going to come as fast as the army is. But it is the way out.

Senator LEAHY. And if your staff could keep me posted, both of you, on how that's going, because I'm one who wants to see it work, and I know a number of our Vermonters are going to be involved in helping to train. I think the potential is there. I think it's a real uphill battle.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### AIR FORCE/ARMY AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION ISSUES

Secretary Gates, I believe that we must have a fair, open, and honest Air Force tanker acquisition process that ensures that our men and women in uniform receive the best possible aircraft. It's also my belief that the upcoming request for proposals should utilize the best value process so that we're procuring the most capable tanker for our warfighters.

We've talked about this earlier this year and it's my understanding that you stated that you believe the process should be fair, open, transparent. With regard to the process, who will be the acquisition authority for the upcoming tanker competition? Would it be the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Air Force? Also, do you believe that the draft RFP will be released this month?

Secretary GATES. I don't know that it will be released this month, and I'm in the process, the final decision process in terms of the acquisition authority and the structure we're going to put into place to ensure that it is a fair, open, and transparent process.

I would expect to make the decision on the acquisition process within the next week or 10 days. All I have heard is that their hope is to put the RFP out this summer, perhaps next month. I'm not entirely sure about that. And we will fulfill the commitment that we have made to you to share the draft RFP here in the Congress as part of being a transparent process.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, shifting to Army aviation, your proposed budget calls for an additional \$500 million over last year's funding level to field and sustain helicopters. As stated in your testimony, this is an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now, and I support this initiative.

I understand you've indicated the focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews. Could you provide additional details regarding how this money would be spent, either now or for the record?

Secretary GATES. I'd be pleased to do that for the record.

[The information follows:]

As you noted, we have an urgent need to train more helicopter pilots and crews. The budget request includes procurement to buy additional helicopters and expand operation and maintenance for the training. More specifically, as the Army developed their fiscal year 2010 budget they planned for an increase of \$70 million for 22 light utility helicopters above the quantities approved for fiscal year 2009. During the final review of the budget, we increased the Army's aircraft account for the UH-60 by \$156 million to bring the total quantity to 95 or an increase of 26 airframes above the fiscal year 2009 level. I am satisfied that this provides for a balanced increase in these various airframes.

To meet the near-term demand for more trained pilots and crews, we also increased funding by \$276 million for aviation training at Fort Rucker. This level of funding allows the Army to support the goal of increasing pilot throughput to 1,375 per year in fiscal year 2010.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

Secretary GATES. But let me just say that, having visited Fort Rucker, it's clear that the schoolhouse needs to be expanded and modernized.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

## NAVAL SHIP ISSUES

Admiral Mullen, the LCS, littoral combat ships. The Department's 2010 budget provides an increase in purchase in the littoral combat ship from two to three ships. Do you believe that this program will play a vital role in our Navy's future fleet, and could you tell us here the advantages that the Navy will gain once the service begins to utilize the LCS around the world?

Admiral MULLEN. I need LCS at sea deployed today. The urgency of that requirement has been there for a number of years, which is why we started this program, and that urgency hasn't gone away. I'll be very specific about its need in places like the Persian Gulf. It offers unique characteristics in terms of speed and mobility.

Senator SHELBY. Also firepower.

Admiral MULLEN. And firepower. It certainly provides—back to helicopters, if I'm short one thing sort of across the Department, helicopter qualifies for being at the top.

The LCS also has a small crew. It has flexibility in its mission. It has the modules, depending on where you're going to apply it, where you're going to deploy it, whether it's mine warfare or anti-submarine warfare or surface warfare.

So it's a very adaptable platform. I need them out and I need them in numbers as rapidly as we can get them out.

Senator SHELBY. You need them now, too, if you can.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Feinstein.

## INTELLIGENCE/SATELLITES

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to put on my Intelligence hat for a minute. I note Senator Bond has come back. Without getting into details or classified matters, I wanted to ask you about the overhead architecture program. I think it's fair to say that both sides of the aisle on the Intelligence Committee are very concerned about matters dealing with this program, particularly the huge investment in electrical-optical satellites.

Senator Bond mentioned your statement that you would not necessarily favor a 99 percent solution, but a lesser solution. So my question is, can the Department's imagery needs be met with a larger number of lower resolution systems?

Secretary GATES. I have agreed with Admiral Blair on the architecture that is before you and before this subcommittee. I would say first of all that I think that the primary need for the very high resolution of the upper tier of capabilities is needed above all by the intelligence community. We have had those kinds of satellites—obviously, the new ones are much more sophisticated than when I was last in the intelligence business. But we have always needed that kind of resolution and multimission capability.

My view, the reason that I supported going with the lower tier satellites, frankly is because there is some schedule and technology



risk associated with the upper tier. I felt very strongly about having a capability that was proven technology and that we would have high confidence would work and meet, with the upper tier, the needs of the military.

I would have to get back to you for the record in terms of what military needs are satisfied by the higher resolution capability.

[The information follows:]

Classified response was sent directly from the SECDEF's office to the subcommittee on August 11, 2009.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, if you would, I think both Senator Bond and I would appreciate it.

We have extraordinarily serious concern involving the waste of many, many dollars over a period of years and are rather determined that that not happen again. We also have information that the so-called lesser tiered satellites can be just as effective and have a stealth capability. So if you would get back to us on that point, we hope to sit down with Senator Inouye and Senator Cochran and our staff and talk very seriously on this issue, because you know, to make a mistake once or twice is all right, but to continue that mistake doesn't make sense, I think, to the vice chairman or to myself or to other members of the subcommittee or to our technical advisory group who has looked at this as well.

So if you would, I would appreciate it very much.

#### IRAN

Let me move on to another thing. There has been a lot of discussion in the public press about the possibility of Israel attacking Iran. I think we asked you the last time you were before us: In the last year, do you believe that the chances of that happening have gone up or down?

Secretary GATES. Well, I'd hesitate to speculate about the decisions of another government. But I would say that our concern about the nature of the Iran problem has continued to rise as they continue to make further progress in enriching uranium and particularly in their public statements and also as they have enjoyed some success in their missile field.

So I would say that our concerns with Iran's programs—and I believe I can say also Israel's—has continued to grow, given the unwillingness of the Iranians to slow, stop, or even indicate a willingness to talk about their programs.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

#### AFGHANISTAN TROOP LEVELS

A final question if I may, Mr. Chairman. It's on the subject of Afghanistan. We have slipped into this very easily, very quickly. I believe there are about 68,000 men and women either due to Afghanistan or already there. Is that a correct figure?

Secretary GATES. Yes, ma'am.

Senator FEINSTEIN. And you look back at 48 years of history, and let me just give you one quote from a recent Government Accountability Office report. It said: "Some progress has occurred in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan national security forces. But the overall security situ-

ation in Afghanistan has not improved after more than 7 years of United States and international efforts.”

I’m one that has deep concern as to how you turn this country around after 40 years into a much more secure area. I know you’re making changes and maybe they work and maybe they don’t work. I don’t know. But could you share with us how you see this going, because this is a large commitment over a substantial unknown period of time, with no known benchmarks, no known exit strategy at this time, but just a continuation of beefing up troops and changing commanders.

So if you could give us some idea of what benchmarks you would hold, how you would evaluate success, where you would look for it, and within what timeframe, I think it would be very helpful.

Secretary GATES. Let me open and then ask Admiral Mullen to add his thoughts. First of all, I think that the administration’s new strategy gives us some opportunities that we have not had before, and I think the strategy brings a focus to our efforts that we may not have had before.

#### AFGHANISTAN

The reality is the situation in Afghanistan went along okay after 2002 until about 2006, and it coincided to a considerable degree to—the beginning of greater Taliban activity in Afghanistan began as Pakistan began to do these peace agreements with various insurgent and extremist groups on their western border, which then freed the Taliban to come across the border because they had no pressure from the Pakistani army.

That situation has continued to worsen, and it is a combination of the Taliban, which are the heart of the problem we face, but not the only piece of it—the Hakkani network, Al Qaeda, and Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and these others. So as this problem became worse in terms of the violence caused by the Taliban coming across the border from Pakistan, I think that it’s self-evident that we were underresourced to deal with it. We did not have the military capabilities or the civilian capabilities in terms of counterinsurgency to be able to deal with it.

I think under the administration’s new strategy we’ll have both the military and the civilian capacity to be able to make headway with the Afghans. I think the key here is the strengthening of the Afghan National Army and police that we talked about earlier. It is the strengthening of other institutions in Afghanistan.

I think one of the things that’s important to remember about Afghanistan is that we have 40 some other nations there as our allies. This is not just the United States carrying this by ourselves. Now, do we wish they had more troops? Do we wish they spent more money? Absolutely. But the fact is our allies have 32,000 troops in Afghanistan. This is not a trivial commitment on their part. As I think Senator Leahy pointed out, the Canadians, the British, the Australians, the Danes, and others have been in the fight and have lost a lot of people.

So I think that the new strategy and now the newest development which gives me more hope than I’ve had in quite a while—the newest development of the Pakistani army taking on these extremists in Swat and elsewhere I think is an extremely important

development, and the possibility of the Afghans, the Pakistanis, ourselves, and our allies together working against this problem has given me more optimism about the future than I've had in a long time in Afghanistan.

I will say we have developed in the inter-agency benchmarks for success. I've pressed very hard for these because I said the last administration had benchmarks forced upon it; let's volunteer them. Let's say, here's what we think we need to achieve and here's how we can measure ourselves against this.

My own view is it's very important for us to be able to show the American people that we are moving forward by the end of the year or a year from now, to show some shift in momentum. This is a long-term commitment, but I think the American people will be willing to sustain this endeavor if they believe it's not just a stalemate and that we're sacrificing lives and not making any headway. So I think the benchmarks are important and I think making an evaluation a year from now of where we are is important.

The last point I'd make before turning it over to Admiral Mullen is I'm very sensitive about the number of troops we put into Afghanistan. I'm too familiar with the Soviets having had 110,000 troops there and still losing. If you don't have the right strategy and if you don't have the Afghan people on your side, you will not win in Afghanistan because, as the Admiral said, they are a warrior nation.

So I think that we have to be very cautious about significantly further expanding the American military footprint in Afghanistan, in my view.

Admiral.

Admiral MULLEN. Ma'am, I'm encouraged there is a strategy and it's a regional strategy. It's not just Afghanistan or Pakistan, because I think they're inextricably linked and we've got to approach it in that, with that in mind.

Second, I recognize that it has changed a lot since 2002 and the resources we're putting in there now meet a need that we've had for some time. Our lessons learned from Iraq, the counterinsurgency force that we are, the civilian-military approach that we now have, obviously with Ambassador Holbrooke, who has focused this effort and does so full time—I believe we know what we need to do. I too am concerned about time and think that with these forces we're putting in there now we've got to reverse the trend of violence over the next 12 to 18 months.

I think it's possible. So I think we have the strategy right. We're resourcing it right. But I do not underestimate the difficulty of the challenge here, the benchmarks, not only in security, which are important, but also in governance and improvement in whether local tribal leaders, local district, sub-district leaders are providing for their people, and that we make the Afghan people the center of gravity here.

We've been through some difficult times with civilian casualties. We can't keep doing that. The more we do that, the more we back up, and it hurts our strategy. So I am actually optimistic, more than I was, but I think the next 12 to 18 months will really tell the tale.

Secretary GATES. We heard two statistics on a teleconference, videoconference, with Kabul this morning from one of our commanders. They believe this year will be the first year in 30 years that Afghanistan will not need to import wheat, that the wheat crop is sufficiently robust that they won't need to import.

And just as important, it's at basically price parity with poppies, and in some districts even higher value than poppies. So maybe I'm grasping at straws, but I thought that was pretty interesting.

Senator FEINSTEIN. It's a good one to grasp.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Bond.

Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, I agree with what you've said. I believe the counterinsurgency strategy is important. I think we have to realize that, while our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies had many people over there, they very often didn't get into the fight. They were restrained in the compounds. They traveled around in armored tanks and went back home at night, and the Taliban works at night. We did not have an effective force.

The Admiral has said we have to have an Afghan face. We've got to do that. The counterinsurgency strategy is essential. I know the commanders emergency response, the CERP funds, were used to buy wheat, at least in Nangahar Province, and that kind of rebuilding of agriculture I think is a critical key.

But I would just ask you: Is it reasonable to expect the counterinsurgency to pacify the whole country in 12 or 18 or even 24 months? It seems to me we have to be realistic and we have to say, yes, we're seeing signs of progress. Nangahar Province for example is an area that I know about and poppy production has dropped almost to nothing. But still, does it not take some time to get the full benefits of the counterinsurgency strategy? Should we be looking at a slightly longer timeframe?

Secretary GATES. Absolutely, Senator. What I was referring to and I think what Admiral Mullen was referring to is hoping to see a shift in the momentum over the course of the next year to 18 months. This problem will not be over in 18 months. This problem will not be over in 2 years. This is, let's be honest, a long-term commitment that we are involved in in Afghanistan if we are to ultimately be successful.

I think what we are saying simply is that we think that the strategy needs to show some signs that it's working, not that it has been totally successful a year or 18 months from now.

Senator BOND. I think you can cite Nangahar as one little province that's working. With the marines going into Helmand, I think that you'll see some changes there.

I would mention, following up on what my good friend from California said, the kinds of overhead requirements you have. I was talking with Admiral Blair earlier this morning about intelligence needs in Afghanistan for the PRTs and others. He needed some overhead. That's the kind of thing that we think can very well be supplied in terms of military needs by the smaller, cheaper, more flexible alternatives that we would like to see with NGEQ. We

would welcome the opportunity to talk and we will look forward to talking with the chairman, the ranking member, and other members of the subcommittee in a classified setting about some of the problems and some of the opportunities.

I hope that we will be able to continue to talk with you about that, because we feel very strongly about the overhead.

#### JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

I want to ask one other point. I agree with Admiral Mullen on so many things. At breakfast last week you said: "We're all concerned about the industrial base. I have been for a period of time. The competition for who is going to build the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was done years ago, essentially moving down to one contractor, and that's where we are. What I worry about, you want as much competition for as long as you can. That said, we years ago got down to a minimum number of competitors. I'm concerned about how I do not have a lot of other choices about where to go to build. I think it's an important consideration. We need to pay attention to it."

I would agree with those statements and I think that maintaining the F/A-18 as a bridge, moving forward on the C-17, and the next generation bomber, which you, Mr. Secretary, you indicated you wish to pursue, are all parts of that strategy. I happen to think that, no matter who won the competition, giving the entire purchase was a tragic mistake on the tac air. I would like to hear your comments, both Secretary and Admiral, on the defense industrial base.

Secretary GATES. Well, it is a concern and, frankly, the last time I was in Government in 1993 we had a lot of choices, and when we wanted to build satellites we had multiple choices as well. So I think that, with respect to the F/A-18, we have 31 in the budget for fiscal year 2010. We will probably buy more in 2011. One of the subjects that the Quadrennial Defense Review is examining is the right balance for our tactical air, and I look forward to the conclusions of the QDR on that.

#### AIRCRAFT ISSUES

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Bond, it's a great airplane. It's actually at a great price. You've certainly dealt with the multiyear aspect of this. One of the reasons it is at a great price is because it has been under multiyear a number of times.

That said, we're at a point in time where we're trying to figure out how long the program goes on, how many more years. That's really the analysis that's at the heart of this.

As I said the other day, although I'm amazed you got absolutely every word I said very accurately—

Senator BOND. My other business is intel.

Admiral MULLEN. And I do have a concern about the industrial base, in airplanes, in ships, in satellites. We dramatically brought the defense contractors together in the 90s and that, by virtue of that, eliminated an awful lot of competition.

So I don't have the answer with how we go ahead here, except I think we do have to pay attention to it over the long run and make some strategic decisions. I think the "we" there is the De-

partment, the services, the industry itself, as well as here in Congress. It's that strategic relationship which I think is important, which says this is how much of America's industrial base we are going to make sure is in good shape for the future. The requirements of that obviously drive that continuation.

As I said before and would only repeat, it was years ago this decision was made about the JSF and at that point in time it's my view we made a national decision to go down to, essentially to go down to one contractor for the future, and we're living with the results of that now.

Senator BOND. I think that's a tragedy. I've made my point time and time again at these hearings year after year. I have an answer for you. If you ever want to call me some time, I'll be happy to share it with you. But I'm not the witness today, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. You know, I used to be in intelligence and I think I know the answer.

Senator BOND. I'll bet you do. We'll see if we can communicate by mental telepathy.

But can we expect the study assessing the cost-benefits of an F/A-18 multiyear any time soon? I think it was requested in law to be delivered a couple of months ago.

Secretary GATES. We can certainly provide a response, Senator. I think that what we are hoping to do is be able to give you a meaningful response after the QDR. If the decision, for example, were made to continue the F/A-18 line, then a multiyear contract would make all the sense in the world, for exactly the reasons you and Admiral Mullen have been talking about.

We can provide you an interim response if you would like.

Senator BOND. I just think that was required in law, and the QDR, I know everybody hypes it, but if it's just a justification of what you put in the budget—I hope there will be some thinking on that, broader thinking along the lines that maybe Admiral Mullen suggested and your intelligence suggests.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. Secretary, I was intrigued with one of the points you made in testifying before the Appropriations Committee on the war supplement, where you said that it would be useful in our dealings with Iran to have a missile defense that is aimed only at Iran, and that played into the relationship that we have with Russia; and it is generally recognized that if we're to be successful in dealing with Iran we're going to have to have cooperation of other countries, perhaps mostly Russia.

We've talked before about the issue of having Russia enrich Iran's uranium, which Russia has offered to do and Iran has declined, as a way of being sure that Iran is not moving toward the use of enriched uranium for military purposes.

A two-part question. No. 1: Is any progress being made on publicizing Russia's offer, which I think has gotten scant little attention, and the Iranian refusal really shows—raises the inference of potential bad faith? Second, where do we stand on efforts to pick up your

suggestion that missile defense be aimed only at Iran and not at Russia, which has given so many political problems?

Secretary GATES. First, I think that, although it's certainly not been a secret, it has not been I think widely enough publicized, Russia's offer and Iran's turn-down of it. I think equally not publicized was the fact that the United States indicated that we thought that was a pretty good idea and would be supportive.

With respect to the missile defense, I still have hope that we can get the Russians to partner with us on missile defense directed against Iran.

Senator SPECTER. Have we made that offer, suggesting that missile defense would not be aimed at Russia?

Secretary GATES. Oh, yes. And I've made it myself to then-President Putin and I've made it to President Medvedev. We've made a number of offers in terms of how to partner, and I think there are still some opportunities, for example perhaps putting radars in Russia, having data exchange centers in Russia.

So I think the administration is very interested in continuing to pursue this prospect with the Russians, and it may be that our chances are somewhat improved or making progress because I think the Russians—when I first met with President Putin and talked about this, he basically dismissed the idea that the Iranians would have a missile that would have the range to reach much of Western Europe and much of Russia before 2020 or so, and he showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared. And I told him he needed a new intelligence service.

The fact of the matter is the Russians have come back to us and acknowledged that we were right in terms of the nearness of the Iranian missile threat. So my hope is—and that they had been wrong. So my hope is we can build on that and perhaps, perhaps at the President's summit meeting with President Medvedev, perhaps begin to make some steps where they will partner with us and Poland and the Czech Republic in going forward with missile defense in this third site.

I would say, although I took the money out of the 2010 budget for the third site, the reason I did that is because we have enough money in the budget from 2009 that would enable us to do anything in the way of construction necessary.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining? There's no clock here.

#### SYRIA

I'm pleased to see the announcement of the joint military operations or sending military commanders to Syria. It appears to be part of a general change in U.S. policy which I believe is long overdue in trying to at least explore with Syria the possibilities of having them stop destabilizing Lebanon and stop supplying Hamas and moving toward negotiations, which have been brokered so long now by Turkey, with Israel.

What do you say for the opportunities to improve relationships with Syria along those lines?

Secretary GATES. Well, I guess my attitude would be that there's no harm in trying. The CENTCOM representatives who will be going to Syria—I think their mandate is focused on the security of

the border between Syria and Iraq, and particularly to try and enlist Syria's support in stopping the foreign fighters from crossing that border into Iraq and attacking us and the Iraqis.

Senator SPECTER. I have one more question. There may be good news in the offing with what is happening along a number of fronts. The election results in Lebanon with Hezbollah losing and the dominance of U.S.-backed interests is certainly encouraging. There's speculation that President Obama's speech in Cairo may have had some effect on that. The political campaign in Iran by all press accounts is about as much of a political brawl as you see, I'm about to pick south Philadelphia as an illustration.

The question that is in my mind, I'm interested in your views as to whether the change in policy toward Lebanon and Syria and the speech that President Obama has made—is there any intelligence that that is having an impact on the forthcoming Iranian elections and whether it has had any impact on the elections in Lebanon?

Secretary GATES. I have not seen any intelligence specifically relating to either Lebanon or Iran on that.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you all for being here and for what you do for all of our men and women who serve this country. I really do appreciate it.

I apologize for my voice. I was out in Seattle this week and it was warm weather and the allergy season went crazy. Secretary Gates, you're going to be out there, I believe, to speak to the University of Washington, so be prepared. But I apologize for my voice.

#### ACQUISITION

I understand I missed some questions from Senator Shelby on the tanker competition and your statement that you expected some kind of decision on how to move forward in the next 7 to 10 days. I wanted to ask you, is that discussion going to include who will lead the process, whether it's you or the Air Force?

Secretary GATES. The period 7 to 10 days was how we will structure the acquisition and who the acquisition authority will be. I'm in the process of making those decisions right now, but have not made final decisions. I don't know with specificity, but, as I told Senator Shelby, our hope is to probably try and get the RFP out mid-summer, and we will fulfill our commitment to bring the draft up for you to look at.

Senator MURRAY. I really appreciate that.

I just wanted to ask you if you're thinking about what kind of measures you're going to take to make sure that we don't have claims of unfair evaluation or the scales being tipped one way or the other as we move through this.

Secretary GATES. Well, part of the process I'm going through right now is to try and structure this in a way that puts the best people on this program and that provides a supervisory role; and right now, tentatively thinking, I'm going to clearly ask the Deputy Secretary to take a very close interest in this process.



Senator MURRAY. Clearly this is a real challenge. We all want the best aircraft at the end of the day. We all want fair and transparent competition. Everybody's saying that and I think that's clear. We all want the best for the warfighter. We also want what's best for the taxpayer as well.

You have been a strong proponent of the winner-take-all competition. Is that still your opinion at this point?

Secretary GATES. Yes, ma'am.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much.

#### ACQUISITION REFORM

Secretary Gates, let me ask you. You've referred to your budget as a reform budget, reforming how and what we buy. I'm really worried about how we are balancing this acquisition reform effort in relation to our domestic industrial base. I'm worried about the long-term ability of our domestic industrial base to provide our military forces what they need to accomplish their national security missions.

Since we talked last April, I have worked with Chairman Levin on the acquisition reform bill and included language to require a report regarding the effects that cancelling a major acquisition program would have on the Nation's industrial base. I wanted to ask you today if you can tell me how you are taking into account the health and longevity of our domestic industrial base, including our suppliers, design engineers, manufacturers, as you tackle acquisition reform in the DOD?

Secretary GATES. Well, I think so far, in terms of the decisions that I've made, most of the decisions have not been taken with a view to the industrial base, but rather acquisition programs that had been extremely badly managed, in substantial measure by the Department of Defense. So I would say that, in all honesty, not very many of the decisions that I have made were made with the industrial base being as an important consideration, but rather as acquisition programs gone badly awry.

But as we go forward, as Admiral Mullen talked about a few minutes ago, clearly we have concerns about the industrial base. But to be perfectly honest, decisions made a long time ago have limited our options in this respect. The best example, as he cited, is the Joint Strike Fighter. So we are where we are, and—

Senator MURRAY. We are where we are, but if we keep going down this road then 10 years from now have to ask, oh my gosh, what happened? If we don't start thinking about it now, we're going to be in a bad place. So I agree with you, we've looked at acquisition reform in terms of contracts gone bad. I do think we have to start talking about acquisition reform in terms of our industrial base as well. I hope we can work with you on that.

Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. If I could just offer one other thing, and I spoke to this earlier. But the other thing that I have found which keeps primes very focused as well as subs is predictability. We can't keep changing the program, whatever it is, whoever "we" is, because we all do this, year after year after year, because they just won't plan. They won't invest in the industrial base if there is great uncertainty and great risk associated with that.

So as we come to grips with this whole issue of acquisition, which I think we need to do and which this budget really attempts to do and the acquisition reform legislation is critical to that, is that is a key piece, is can we get programs into some level of predictability and stability.

Senator MURRAY. I think that's really important. So thank you with that.

#### MILITARY HEALTHCARE

Secretary Gates, I wanted to applaud the budget plan in terms of military healthcare. I really think it goes a long ways toward ensuring that all our servicemembers and their eligible family members have access to and get the best medical care possible. I just want to say, I am still, as I think all of you are, still very concerned about the psychological health of our servicemembers. We continue to see reports—and Admiral Mullen, I know combat-related stress is a great concern for you. If you can just address that for a minute here and tell us what you're doing systemwide to continue to focus on that?

Admiral MULLEN. Again, this budget puts a lot more money in that direction and that's key. We, leadership throughout the Department and clearly the military leadership, is very focused on making more capability and capacity, more mental health providers available. I won't rest on the fact that we're short nationally. If I do that, then I just accept that we're going to be short, and I'm not going to do that until I have no other choice, and I just don't believe we've wrung it out.

We've taken some steps in the stigma issue, but that's still a huge issue. I don't think we really remove that until we get to a point where everybody receives an effective screening and it's not voluntary—you must do it—and create again opportunities to both understand when somebody is suffering, as so many are right now, which is pretty normal and pretty human.

So leadership will continue to focus on this. In fact, it was at Fort Lewis—I was there maybe 18 months ago now—that really—Madigan has really got some very innovative staff personnel, medical personnel there. We're trying to pay attention to them and to spread those kinds of best practices.

But we're not there yet. As long as we've been at this, it's still early.

Secretary GATES. Let me just add two things. First of all, the Admiral mentioned money. This budget, we budgeted \$428 million just for psychological health in 2009, fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2010 budget will have \$750 million in it, so a substantial increase focused strictly on psychological health.

#### MENTAL HEALTHCARE

Second, one of the things that I'd like to explore with the Congress and it goes to the issue of the availability of mental healthcare providers. The truth is there are a lot of places in this country where we are trying to hire them and they aren't available. We have hired a lot, but not as many as we would like.

One of the things that I'd like to explore with the Congress is expanding the military medical education program so that it goes be-

yond just physicians and includes mental healthcare professionals, whether it's people getting master's degrees—and I'm not talking necessarily about funding somebody to become a psychiatrist, but somebody who can do counseling and somebody who is the first-line provider for mental healthcare, and to pay for that education for someone in exchange for a commitment to the military, and then frankly we will have done the country a service because then they can go out into the broader population.

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Secretary, I think that's exactly what we need to be doing because, as the Admiral mentioned, this isn't just a DOD problem; it's a problem for everyone. And we can't just say we hope that they come through the other system. I think if the military really focuses on that and promotes and sustains a program within itself, it will help the military. It will also help the rest of us. So I think it's a great idea and I really would like to work with you on making that happen.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to seeing you out in Seattle at the Husky graduation.

#### AIRCRAFT ISSUES

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, as we close this session I'd like to make a couple of observations if I may. Your decision to terminate the acquisition of the C-17s, the F-22s, the DDG 1000, and the future combat system vehicles, we have concerns that it may send the wrong signal to our friends and our potential aggressors that we are reducing our capability. It may also have a long-term impact on our defense industrial base. It may diminish our capacity to provide deterrence and reduce our strength that we provide to our allies. We hope that this is not the consequence, but some have the concern.

#### VETERAN HEALTH/MENTAL CARE

The second observation is that in that ancient war in which I involved myself about 65 years ago, the casualties were high, but the survival rate was not as good as the ones we have today. For example, in my regiment, which in 1 year's time we went through, from 5,000 men, 12,000 because of replacements, we had no double amputee survivor. None of those survived. Yet if you go to Walter Reed today, double amputations are commonplace.

We had no brain injury survivors. As a result, as I look back, we had very little psychological concerns. But today we have survival rates so well because of high technology that double amputees, triple amputees are surviving, brain injuries are surviving. As we can anticipate, as Senator Murray pointed out, psychological problems become commonplace. I just hope that we are preparing ourselves to cope with all of these problems.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

With that, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, for your contributions today. We hope that we can continue our discussions because we will be submitting to you, if we may, questions for your concern and response.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO ROBERT M. GATES

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES

*Question.* Secretary Gates, our troops entered Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. We soon realized that the threat environment for our military operations was quite different than what we were prepared and equipped for. We responded by rapidly developing and fielding thousands of anti-IED jammers, more than 16,000 mine resistant ambush protective vehicles and countless intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. All of these programs have saved American lives, yet none of them are Programs of Record and they are all managed outside of the traditional Defense Department bureaucracy. Why was it necessary to go outside of the regular Department of Defense acquisition process? And how can we institutionalize these capabilities instead of continuously adding more layers to the bureaucracy?

*Answer.* Force protection has always been a priority for our troops. The enemy we face and the tactics and technology we have employed have been truly remarkable. The evolving threat environment requires continued, proactive management of anti-IED programs to keep warfighters protected and as safe as possible given technological limitations. We learn from each innovation and that knowledge will be reflected in all our IED-related acquisition programs. I am very interested in applying these lessons to Afghanistan and to our future programs.

*Question.* One of the reasons our acquisition system is so cumbersome and inflexible lies in requirements that often demand gold-plated solutions that can take years to develop. Many of the rapid fielding capabilities we're now sending to theater may only represent a 75 percent solution, but collectively, they seem to get the job done. What is your assessment of the new equipment we've been sending into theater? Are we addressing our warfighters' needs?

*Answer.* In general, the new equipment fielded has had a huge impact in theater, especially in Iraq. The Department is capitalizing on the wartime procurement lessons learned so that Afghanistan can benefit from these experiences. Much of the rapidly, urgently fielded ISR, C2, UAS, force protection, and Counter-IED capabilities are typically low-cost, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or slightly modified-COTS solutions. The short, time-certain need period is a determinant factor. The speed of development and production is increasingly important. Our focus is to improve our ability to anticipate requirements and therefore minimize the need for partial solutions.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

*Question.* Secretary Gates, roughly 6 months ago, your office issued guidance declaring irregular warfare to be as "strategically important as traditional warfare". You state that the fiscal year 2010 budget rebalances capabilities and provides roughly 10 percent for irregular warfare, 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and 40 percent for dual-use capabilities. However, with no out-year budget data and no movement by the military services to significantly adapt doctrine and training, how can the Committee be assured that "irregular warfare" is not just a convenient way to cut programs or justify new programs?

*Answer.* You cannot be assured that the Department of Defense is genuinely increasing its emphasis on irregular warfare until we complete our Quadrennial Defense Review and send you our fiscal year 2011 budget and outyear plans reflecting the results of that Review. My decisions for the fiscal year 2010 budget were only a beginning. We still have to make some tough decisions and then explain how our new emphasis on irregular warfare is not just a convenient way to cut programs and justify new ones.

*Question.* How will you ensure that the military services will not scale back their full spectrum readiness training too much, so that we can continue to dominate and prevail in major combat operations?

*Answer.* We will ensure that prudent readiness is maintained the same way we traditionally do—by insisting on sufficient funding for readiness requirements and by having our military and civilian leaders checking on readiness in the field.

## ACQUISITION REFORM—REQUIREMENTS

*Question.* Secretary Gates, as we look at improving the acquisition system due to massive cost overruns and schedule delays, perhaps we should think about the way that weapon system requirements are generated and validated. It appears that too often, “requirements creep”, or reaching for immature technologies makes programs too costly and off-schedule. How can the Department better manage requirements, and perhaps change the service cultures, so that acquisition programs are more likely to provide needed capabilities on time and on cost?

*Answer.* The Department has established a number of important new policies to improve requirements formulation, establish more effective program technical foundations, and control “requirements creep”:

- To reduce technical risk and refine program requirements, our practice will be to conduct competitive prototyping and complete Preliminary Design Reviews before we initiate a program,
- We will employ independent technical reviews to certify the maturity of program technologies before we permit a program to proceed to the costly final phases of development and finally,
- We have established Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) with broad executive membership to review all requirements changes and significant technical configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and schedule impacts to the program.

The intent is to prevent “requirements creep” and defer any changes to future program increments. We believe these actions, complemented by those directed in the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act, will ensure that our requirements and acquisition approach are tightly related, and that this disciplined approach will result in significantly improved program outcomes.

*Question.* Do you believe that your staff has the analytic support, such as modeling and simulation tools, for objective analysis to help prioritize requirements?

*Answer.* The procedures established in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs/requirements.

Models and simulations are an important part of the process to identify capability gaps and potential materiel and non-materiel solutions. These are used to support the analytical process by objectively considering a range of operating, maintenance, sustainment, and acquisition approaches through the incorporation of innovative practices. Specifically, as new requirements are identified, models and simulations are used in an analysis of alternatives process to determine if the new requirements can be satisfied through changes in tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine, training, or leadership. If the analysis of alternatives does not identify alternate solutions to the need, then models and simulations play an important role in concept exploration to identify costs and benefits to potential materiel solutions.

Modeling and simulation tools are available and adequate for objective analysis; through outreach and education, we are continuing to improve the knowledge and expertise of the DOD modeling and simulation workforce.

*Question.* What improvements or changes would you recommend in order to better manage requirements?

*Answer.* We are continuously evaluating methods to streamline the management of requirements. To that end, we have made recent changes in the requirements development and management process.

- We are limiting the number of documents that must go through joint review and oversight to those that impact joint operations.
- We have provided guidance to better scope the analysis done in the capability gap assessment process. This will reduce time and resources required while presenting an appropriately defined requirements gap to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for validation. This will allow the Department to move more quickly from the requirements process into the acquisition process.
- We have recognized that information technology systems need to have a more flexible requirements management process than traditional hardware programs. To address this, we have better tailored the requirements process as it applies to information technology systems. Once the JROC approves the initial performance requirements and provides overarching cost and schedule constraints, it will delegate requirements management and oversight to an appropriate Flag level body that has the time and flexibility to effectively manage the development of these systems.

We are also working on future improvements to the requirements management process:

- We are developing an information technology data management tool which will allow us to structure the data in requirements documents to make the information more readily available and visible for comparison and analysis.
  - We are developing a similar tool for managing joint urgent needs to allow for more rapid information sharing so that we can make decisions more rapidly and get solutions into the hands of the warfighter more quickly.
- We will continue to identify opportunities to improve the requirements management process to ensure we provide the correct level of oversight balanced with the ability to respond efficiently to the warfighter's needs.

#### STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAM TERMINATIONS

*Question.* Secretary Gates, we understand that the fiscal year 2010 budget is a step towards rebalancing resources to build irregular warfare capacity applicable to the current fight. But we still face threats from traditional nation states such as North Korea and potentially Iran or others. How do program terminations such as the F-22, C-17 and Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicle affect our ability to respond to traditional threats? Are we swinging the pendulum too far the other way?

*Answer.* Although the proposed fiscal year 2010 defense budget reflects some shifts in emphasis, it is important for the United States to maintain its capabilities for conventional warfare dominance. All of the Military Departments are challenged to find the right balance between making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and to be prepared for likely future threats. With this budget, I have tried to make a holistic assessment of the capabilities, requirements, risks and needs across the Military Departments.

#### DE-MILITARIZING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

*Question.* Secretary Gates, you have repeatedly made statements about the need to improve the coordination and collaboration of efforts among the Department of Defense, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and non-governmental organizations. Mr. Secretary, you have even taken the highly unusual step for a Defense Secretary to support an increased budget for the State Department. Can you give the Committee some examples of where this inter-agency effort is currently being employed and how it could be expanded?

*Answer.* There are many examples of where interagency work is ongoing and could be expanded. What follows are a few examples of such cooperation:

- Strategic Planning.*—Civilian agencies have participated in DOD's strategic planning processes, including the development of DOD's strategic guidance for employing its forces, Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans, and the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD participates in a range of planning activities led by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Homeland Security.
- Building Partner Capacity.*—Innovative "dual key" tools like Section 1206 allow DOD and the Department of State to address security challenges that are the shared responsibility of both Departments. The Secretary of Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence, has leveraged the expertise resident in both departments to execute over \$700 million in train and equip programs in over 40 countries. Separately, DOD, the Department of State, and USAID have published guidance on security sector reform to better integrate train-and-equip programs with efforts that build partner institutions to sustain long-term security.
- Reconstruction and Stabilization.*—DOD has worked closely with the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in developing an Interagency Management System (IMS) to provide reconstruction and stabilization expertise and whole-of-government planning support for complex contingencies. Realization of the full potential of IMS requires full funding of the Department of State's Civilian Stabilization Initiative.
- Humanitarian Assistance.*—DOD's humanitarian assistance guidance ensures that projects align with wider foreign policy objectives and do not duplicate or replace the work of civilian organizations. DOD is formalizing a USAID role in the clearance process.
- Military-Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Relations.*—DOD and InterAction—the umbrella for many U.S.-based NGOs—jointly developed guidelines for how the U.S. Armed Forces and NGOs should relate to one another in hostile environments. We continue to educate both communities about the guidelines, foster dialogue, and develop NGO-military liaison arrangements.

Effective interagency coordination and collaboration also depend on giving our civilian partners greater capacity. When our civilian departments and agencies are more robust and engaged with DOD, military risk is reduced and deployments are minimized. For these reasons, I strongly urge you to support the President's fiscal year 2010 foreign affairs and foreign assistance requests. We also need your help in fully funding and authorizing Section 1207 "Security and Stabilization Assistance" for fiscal year 2010. The President requested \$200 million for this important program for fiscal year 2010. Unfortunately, the House Armed Services Committee reduced Section 1207 spending authority from \$100 million to \$25 million in its National Defense Authorization Act mark-up. Section 1207 allows DOD to help the Department of State and USAID address security challenges and defuse crises that might otherwise require a U.S. military response, and it has catalyzed interagency collaboration on Country Teams and in Washington.

#### GROUND-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE (ALASKA INTERCEPTORS)

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the budget request would effectively stop the emplacement of ground-based interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska. Has the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland changed to warrant curtailing this program?

*Answer.* The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is designed to defeat the relatively small number of unsophisticated missiles that could be launched by a rogue nation against U.S. territory. The rogue country ICBM threat has not evolved as rapidly as was originally projected in 2002. I am confident that deployment of 26 interceptors in Alaska and 4 in California with four spare missiles plus additional missiles for testing gives the Nation a robust capability. The modified program would retain all previously planned reliability upgrades to the GBIs and maintain the planned number of Ground-Based Missile Defense flight tests. We will close the older, prototype Missile Field One and move those missiles into the newly constructed Missile Field Two resulting in an overall higher reliability rate for those missiles. If the threat were to expand, the United States has time to build additional interceptors.

#### NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM (NPOESS)

*Question.* Secretary Gates, as you know, the Department has had a troubled history with its satellite programs. One of the programs that continue to be plagued with cost growth and schedule problems is NPOESS. Who in the Department of Defense is in charge of making decisions on this program, and what is the plan for the future of the satellite system?

*Answer.* The May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2 directed the merging of the DOD and DOC operational weather satellite systems with the objective of reducing the cost of space based data collection for weather prediction. The PDD/NSTC-2 and the December 2008 Amendment to the Tri-agency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outline the roles and responsibilities of each agency. DOD is named as the lead agency for systems acquisition. As such, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), makes the final acquisition decisions for NPOESS.

Since NPOESS is such a large portion of the NOAA budget, NOAA has dedicated several senior executives to management and oversight of NPOESS. A significant part of the continued cost growth on NPOESS stems from the growing acknowledgment of climate data as critical to our national interest. The program was not initially set up, nor was it set up after the Nunn-McCurdy restructure, to provide the complex instrumentation desired for climate assessment.

Senior DOD and DOC officials have engaged in discussions concerning management of NPOESS. The DOD and DOC are reviewing a number of courses of action to help alleviate the friction. Options range from enforcing the current MOA to single agency management of the program to a split management strategy. DOD and DOC are also engaged with the Office of Science and Technology Policy to help craft a path forward to benefit all parties involved. The importance of NPOESS and the need to avoid a continuity gap is understood by DOD, DOC, and NASA.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, there are too many people within the Department of Defense that believe they are in charge of satellite acquisition. With no one actually empowered to make decisions on satellite programs, we continue to see large cost growth and schedule delays in these systems. Do you have a plan to fix this chronic problem or will it be addressed in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review?

*Answer.* Ensuring future space systems are delivered within promised cost and schedule targets requires the proper checks and balances necessary to appropriate management and oversight of the Nation's acquisition programs. In June 2008, the DOD established the Space and Intelligence Capabilities Organization, reporting directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

(USD(AT&L)), to perform and be accountable for all acquisition oversight and related matters concerning DOD Space and Intelligence programs. A wide range of space related issues are being addressed in the Space Posture Review.

#### FISCAL YEAR 2010 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS REQUEST

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2010 budget request includes \$130 billion in non-emergency spending for overseas contingency operations. In the past, the administration has had difficulty predicting the full year costs of these operations. For example, in fiscal year 2008, the administration submitted along with the regular budget request a full-year supplemental request for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But within 8 months, the administration submitted two budget amendments to this supplemental request. How confident are you in the fiscal year 2010 overseas contingency operations request that you've submitted to the Congress?

*Answer.* I am very confident about the \$130 billion war-funding request the President sent to Congress on May 7, just over a month ago. However, I acknowledge that as the months go by security situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan can change, and that might mean that there might be changes in what exactly needs to be funded in fiscal year 2010.

*Question.* How will you ensure that urgent, unforeseen warfighter requirements are addressed in the fiscal year 2010 overseas contingency operations budget? Can you assure us that the Committee will be informed of any necessary adjustments?

*Answer.* Yes, I can assure you that my staff and I will keep Congress informed of any needed adjustments in our fiscal year 2010 request, and that is how both Congress and the Department of Defense can address unforeseen warfighter needs.

#### STRAIN ON THE FORCE

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the Army's and Marine Corps' suicide and divorce rates have risen sharply this past year. It appears that the strain of frequent deployments is affecting the emotional health of our soldiers and Marines. Do you believe the Department is doing enough to support service members and their families? What more could we do?

*Answer.* The health and wellbeing of our service members and their families is one of the Department's top priorities and we are addressing suicide prevention and the psychological health of our service members in many ways. The military is the pre-eminent example in suicide prevention, targeting its members with a frequency and number of efforts unparalleled by any other organization.

We are engaged in comprehensive preventive education initiatives. Within the Military Health System (MHS), there are many programs for service members that include the family when providing care and services, especially those deployed or returning from theater. Dedicated resources are focused on identifying the unique problems of military families and establishing or enhancing programs that specifically address the needs of the family. The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) was established in November of 2007 and assesses, validates, oversees, and facilitates prevention, resilience, identification, treatment, outreach, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for psychological health to ensure the Department meets the needs of the Nation's military communities, service members, and families. We have made significant contributions in support of the service members and their families with psychological health and TBI concerns. Furthermore, the services have a forum to discuss their current suicide prevention programs and best practices through the Department of Defense (DOD) Suicide Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee. The Army has specifically been taking multiple proactive steps to address the issue of suicide within its ranks, including the creation of a suicide prevention task force. The task force was developed as part of a month-long "stand down" to address soldier suicides.

#### *Access to Care*

Lack of access to mental health professionals is a particular problem in the MHS due to a shortage of providers and an increased demand for services. The services established an effort to aggressively recruit and retain mental health providers to ensure better access for service members and their families. In the past 2 years, we have placed 1,700 mental health professionals in primary care clinics to increase access and reduce the stigma associated with visiting a mental health facility. In addition, the TRICARE Network has added 10,000 mental health providers, including child psychiatrists and psychologists.

#### *Quality of Care*

Research continues to help DOD better understand the mental health status of military families by providing data to develop programs specifically targeted to cur-



rent needs. Evolving evidence has been used to develop psychological health (including post-traumatic stress disorder) clinical practice guidelines and training materials to ensure service members and families receive the best possible care. In addition to providing additional training to the MHS providers and staff, we are sharing military psychological health resources and clinical guidelines with local and community organizations and providers throughout the country who are often the first line in treating Reserve Component beneficiaries. Training is also offered to TRICARE network providers to continually improve their skills.

#### *Resilience, Protection, Prevention*

As with many conditions, prevention and early diagnosis are critical for those who are in need of psychological healthcare. The services and DOD have recognized that family, friends, and others in the military member's support system need to be aware of the signs that psychological health or TBI treatment may be necessary, and have instituted programs to inform and train them. The Battlemind Transition Office runs the Army's Resiliency Program, a preventive approach intended to strengthen individual service members, their families, their units, and communities and enhance their ability to cope with stress.

#### *Research*

DOD funded research is underway to more precisely identify the effects of war on service members, their families, and especially their children. We are also conducting research to compare the effect on family members of service members who return from deployment wounded versus non-injured. The National Child Traumatic Stress Network Center, based at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences' Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, develops knowledge related to military childhood experiences, develops effective public education materials, and expands and studies effective intervention strategies. We also have an ongoing Family Program Assessment to identify the antecedents and consequences of different levels of family readiness by collecting longitudinal data from Army families across the deployment cycle. This study will identify potential predictors of divorce in military families. This information will then be used to design programs to reduce the rate of divorce in military families. The possibility of expanding this study to all services is being actively considered.

#### *Non-Medical Approaches*

Six years of deployments and multiple deployments prompted the Department to rethink methods and strategies to deliver family support. Now, Military OneSource provides support services 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve component service members and their families worldwide. Toll-free confidential telephonic support and a website, [www.militaryonesource.com](http://www.militaryonesource.com), provide interactive tools, educational materials, discussion boards, links to military and community resources, and tax filing services, among other services. Outreach non-medical counseling offer service members and their family members confidential, short term, situational, problem solving assistance that is instrumental for coping with normal reactions to the stressful situations created by deployments, family separations, and reintegration. Military OneSource offers confidential face-to-face, telephonic, and online counseling up to 12 sessions. The Military and Family Life Consultant program provides professional, confidential, and flexible service delivery on a 30–90 day rotational basis on military installations to meet surge support requirements and to support National Guard and Reserve events. Child and youth behavioral health specialists work with families and educators to identify and help struggling children and families. Additionally, financial counseling is available to assist with the financial concerns of military members and their families during all stages of the deployment cycle.

These are just some of the initiatives we have underway, but we are always looking at the conditions and indicators to determine if there are other actions that can benefit our service members and their families work through their difficult problems.

*Question.* Do you believe that the Army and Marine Corps force structure is large enough to relieve the operational strain on the force?

Answer. Yes, but I will be reviewing the conclusion of the Quadrennial Defense Review on ground forces before making a final assessment.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, you recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan. What is your assessment of how our troops are holding up under the continued high operational tempo?

Answer. The troops I had an honor to meet with displayed a high level of morale. It was inspiring to see their level of commitment and positive demeanor in light of all we are asking them to do.

## AGE AND HEALTH OF TANKER FLEET

*Question.* Secretary Gates, I am concerned about the aging Air Force tanker fleet and the health and age of the KC-135 tankers by the time they are replaced. Can you update the Committee on the status of the Air Force tanker fleet, including the age of the fleet and any present safety and flight concerns with the current fleet?

*Answer.* The USAF tanker force structure includes 415 KC-135 R and T models and 59 KC-10A aircraft with average fleet ages of 48 years and 24 years, respectively. Upon retirement of the last KC-135 planned for 2040, this tanker will have reached 80 years of service. The KC-10 will have achieved 60 years of service upon its planned retirement. Per the fiscal year 2010 Annual Planning and Program Guidance (APPG) and to maintain fleet viability, investment programs for these airframes are focused on safety of flight and obsolescence issues. To this extent, the KC-135 aircraft has six and the KC-10 has two on-going fleet-wide modification programs. Regarding safety of flight issues, the CCAB program addresses the only known "safety of flight" issue for the KC-135. There are no KC-10 safety of flight issues at this time.

The six KC-135 programs consist of the following:

- Control Column Actuated Brake (CCAB).*—Modification preventing an unsafe stabilizer trim wheel runaway condition—fleet modification complete in fiscal year 2010;
- VOR/ILS Antennae Replacement.*—Replaces the obsolescent antennae used for navigation and precision instrument landing systems—this is an fiscal year 2010 New Start program;
- Block 45 Upgrade.*—Cockpit avionics modernization replacing obsolescent Autopilot, Flight Director, Radar Altimeter, and Engine Instruments—contract award late fiscal year 2009;
- Global Air Traffic Management (GATM).*—Updates and replaces Communication Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) equipment to meet restricted airspace requirements worldwide; modification complete in fiscal year 2011;
- Enhanced Surveillance (EHS).*—Replaces APX-110 transponder with APX-119 providing enhanced aircraft tracking and IFF Mode 5 capability (complete by fiscal year 2010);
- Mode 5.*—DOD-mandated upgrade to the Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system used for aircraft identification in Air Defense Operations (fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2012).

The KC-10 provides both strategic air refueling and airlift for deployment, employment, redeployment and Joint/Combined support operations. This aircraft is a commercial derivative of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 and since its first delivery in 1981, no major avionics upgrades have been completed. As such, in its current configuration, the KC-10 does not meet future Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) CNS/ATM requirements for 2015 airspace restrictions. To mitigate operational risk, two modification programs exist for the KC-10:

- CNS/ATM Modification:* addresses near term issues required to keep aircraft operational within 2015 air traffic mandates/restrictions;
- Boom Control Unit Replacement:* replaces unsustainable Boom Control Unit (complete 2012).

## FISCAL YEAR 2010 TANKER CONTRACT AWARD SCHEDULE

*Question.* Secretary Gates, will the tanker replacement program request for proposals go out to industry this summer? Is the Department on track to make a contract award for the tanker replacement in early fiscal year 2010?

*Answer.* Yes. The Department anticipates being able to issue a draft solicitation this summer with award of a contract by late spring 2010.

## TANKER CONTRACT COMPETITION

*Question.* Secretary Gates, do you have confidence that the upcoming tanker contract award will not result in another protest to the Government Accountability Office (GAO)? What is your plan if another protest is upheld by the GAO?

*Answer.* Contractors have the right to protest any contract award. There is no guarantee there will not be a protest in the upcoming tanker competition. I am confident the Department has a process in place to address the original GAO protest decision findings and to ensure a fair competition. If another protest is upheld by the GAO, we will address it at that time.

## STRUCTURAL REPAIRS OF KC-135 TANKERS

*Question.* Secretary Gates, based on the current tanker replacement program, it will take over 30 years to recapitalize the KC-135 fleet. Can you elaborate on the cost of the structural repairs that will need to be done on the KC-135 fleet during the acquisition of the replacement tankers? Can these costs be avoided if the fleet is replaced sooner?

*Answer.* Skin replacements are the major structural repairs that occur on the KC-135 when the skins exceed reparable limits. To date, the number of skins needing replacement has been manageable and have not greatly affected Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) flow and overall aircraft availability. There is a reasonable amount of rework that can be accomplished before most of the structures require replacement. Over time, however, the skins will need to be replaced.

The Air Force is planning for three structural repairs to the KC-135 fleet: replacement of Aft Body Skins, replacement of Upper Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer Skins, and replacement of Crown and Center Wing (wing box) Upper Skins. The KC-X recapitalization rate will influence the number of aircraft requiring each structural repair. The calculations below assume 416 KC-135s require replacement of Aft Body and Upper Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer Skins, but that only 230 KC-135s will require replacement of Crown and Center Wing (wing box) Upper Skins (see below). The dates used in the forecasts were selected to gain the most benefit from the work that will be accomplished. Each estimate uses current year, fiscal year 2009, dollars and is per aircraft. Then year dollars would be more.

*Aft Body Skins*

Replacement of these skins is already programmed to begin in the current FYDP.

Estimated cost per airplane: \$0.3 million.

Estimated total cost: \$124.8 million (416 aircraft).

Max aircraft down: N/A—concurrent with PDM. (Note: Air Force programming this work into the fiscal year 2012 PDM work package reduces potential delays from unscheduled “over and above” work.)

*Upper Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer Skins*

These would be done concurrently, separate from PDM, in a “speed line,” and would include replacement of substructure components that are important to continued use of the aircraft and accessible when the skins are removed. (Note: The “speed line” will be a stand alone repair line dedicated solely to the upper wing and horizontal stabilizer skin replacement work.)

Estimated cost per airplane: \$6.7 million.

Estimated total cost: \$2.8 billion (416 aircraft).

Max aircraft down: 12 (at any one time).

*Crown and Center Wing (Wing Box) Upper Skins*

This replacement is planned further in the future since recent experience has not indicated significant problems with corrosion or cracking. They are planned to be done concurrently in a speed line and separate from PDM. We have accounted for planned retirements in this increment.

Estimated cost per airplane: \$4.6 million.

Estimated total cost: \$1.1 billion (230 aircraft).

Max aircraft down: 12 (at any one time).

Due to the materials and the assembly techniques used when the KC-135 aircraft was originally procured, occurrences of corrosion will continue to be a primary area of concern. Continued inspections, repairs, and preventive maintenance are required to ensure a viable fleet.

*Question.* Can these costs be avoided if the fleet is replaced sooner?

*Answer.* Yes; as indicated in the answers above, some of the costs could be avoided, depending on timing of KC-X replacement and retirement schedule for the KC-135.

## TANKER DUAL BUY STRATEGY

*Question.* Secretary Gates, I understand that you are strongly opposed to awarding contracts to two tanker manufacturers. Can you elaborate on the pros and cons of this dual buy approach and the costs associated with this type of acquisition strategy?

*Answer.* The Department’s analysis and experience convinces us that dual sourcing of the KC-X tanker would be costly and ineffective. We oppose the introduction of two separate training, maintenance and logistics requirements simultaneously into the fleet. Developing two tankers at once would require approximately \$14 billion over The FYDP 10–15. Over the life cycle of KC-X we estimate that dual

sourcing would cost the taxpayers \$7–8 billion when compared to a single source. Doubling the number of tanker platforms complicates the Air Force's mission. The Air Force will have to increase its allocation of limited financial and human capital to support the logistics, maintenance and training needs of two tanker platforms over the lifecycle of these aircraft. These lifecycle inefficiencies and complications are unnecessary, and can be avoided by selecting a single tanker platform.

#### SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM)

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the Commander of the Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson, recently stated that escalating requirements for capabilities provided by Special Operations Forces have outpaced SOCOM's ability to train new personnel and develop critical enablers in the areas of aviation, intelligence, and communications. To mitigate these shortfalls, Admiral Olson has requested that the military services provide Special Operations Command with additional assistance and manpower in these critical support areas. Are the services able to meet these additional requirements? How will this plan be managed, and to what degree has it been incorporated in the fiscal year 2010 budget request?

*Answer.* USSOCOM is working with the Military Departments to leverage capabilities to address Special Operations Forces (SOF) shortages in critical mission areas. USSOCOM is currently coordinating with the Military Departments to address critical support areas. Of note, the Military Departments are opening their recruiting and training aperture to increase the number of students at their training centers, including aviation training, to support SOF requirements. The Military Departments are also assisting with providing a mix of organic and dedicated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications support for USSOCOM.

The demand for SOF capabilities will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. One of the major focus areas for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is to balance the force for irregular warfare capabilities, which includes addressing the support of the Military Departments to Special Operations Forces.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, funding for Special Operations Command has grown from \$2.1 billion in 2001 to nearly \$8.6 billion, including supplemental funding, in fiscal year 2010. During this same time period Special Operations Command's mission has grown exponentially, as evidenced most recently by its designation as the DOD Proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA). Given this rapid growth in both budget and responsibility, how are you ensuring programmatic and fiscal accountability within Special Operations Command?

*Answer.* The resources requested and executed by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are scrutinized and justified throughout the Department's rigorous planning, programming, budgeting and execution process. The discipline of our department-wide processes along with additional actions that USSOCOM has taken internally help ensure that they maintain programmatic and fiscal accountability for the funds allocated to them. Specifically, USSOCOM has implemented several organizational changes and processes to ensure effective stewardship of appropriated funding. The Command has doubled the size of the Financial Management workforce to ensure the appropriate checks and balances are in place, establishing separate Directorates within the Comptroller organization that provide the Command Program and Budget, Policy and fiscal oversight across the enterprise. Also, the Comptroller is now a stand-alone center with direct reporting to the Commander, USSOCOM, on all fiscal matters. Further, USSOCOM complies with the full complement of regulatory and legislative requirements, such as the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982, and the DOD Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP), as well as the Chief Financial Officers' Act of 1990, as amended. Finally, there are a broad range of accounting tools and processes to provide an additional layer of visibility over the use of MFP–11 funds and help identify any potential abnormalities during execution.

#### EXPORT VERSION OF THE F–22

*Question.* Secretary Gates, I believe the Department should consider an export program for the F–22 Raptor fighter aircraft. Under the rules for such a program, the costs for developing an export variant is borne by the interested nation, not the United States. This would enable us to provide advanced fighter capabilities to our close friends and allies. Secretary Gates, what is your view of an export program for an F–22 variant?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense does not plan to promote the sale of an exportable variant of the F–22. The F–22 was designed and developed solely to meet U.S. requirements and, based on a recent analysis by the Department, would require over \$2 billion of non-recurring investment by a purchasing nation to meet

United States Government (USG) exportability requirements. We will continue to implement our longstanding plans to offer the F-35 Lightning II to selected allied and friendly nations through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels based on the USG's evaluation of our foreign policy and national security interests in relation to the potential purchasing nation. The F-35 program, which already has eight cooperative partner nations and two potential FMS purchasers, was developed with exportability in mind. The USG consults closely with our friends and allies on the capability requirements for the current and emerging security environment. The F-35 incorporates coalition warfighting capability and interoperability features in a highly capable, affordable, and supportable 5th generation strike fighter that was designed from its inception to meet the requirements of both the United States and international partners.

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL COMPENSATION

*Question.* Secretary Gates, in the last 10 years, active duty military personnel compensation costs have increased by 91 percent. Do you believe that these costs are sustainable? How are these rising costs affecting the Department's ability to adequately fund your acquisition priorities?

*Answer.* All rising costs, not just military compensation, diminish our ability to fund acquisition adequately.

Whether or not these rising costs are sustainable will depend on several factors, most notably:

- Our progress in moderating the escalating cost of military healthcare.
- Our overhaul of acquisition programs and our ability to control costs in acquisition programs that continue.
- Cooperation with Congress on minimizing non-essential funding in DOD appropriations.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

*Question.* Secretary Gates, in your testimony, you highlighted the need to have the right programs in place for the future to meet our shifting defense requirements.

A few years ago, DOD and NSA developed the Trusted Foundry Program to ensure government access to computer chips for a diverse range of mission critical programs and to slow the erosion of the domestic supply base. At that time, the government faced challenges producing required chips itself and was having trouble maintaining pace with the rapid advances in chip technology.

The Trusted Foundry Program has been successful in providing our government with access to domestically produced chips and cutting edge microelectronic technologies and processes. In fact, I understand that under the Trusted Foundry Program the access to new technologies in a "trusted" environment, has led to an increase in government demand for more advanced domestically produced semiconductors.

Do you agree that demand for the services provided by the Trusted Foundry Program has met and/or exceeded expectations? What do you foresee to be the role of the Trusted Foundry Program and its network of more than 10 foundries over the next 3–5 fiscal years?

*Answer.* Yes, demand for the Trusted Foundry has exceeded our expectations. The role of the Trusted Foundry Program and its network of suppliers over the next 3–5 years will be expanded to cover the full defense-wide requirements for trusted microelectronics for Defense systems and weapons.

#### TRUSTED FOUNDRY

*Question.* Does the demand for the chips and services from the Trusted Foundry currently exceed the contracted services provided for in the fiscal year 2009 budget?

*Answer.* Yes, current demand has exceeded the services contracted directly through the Trusted Access Program Office. Several programs like JTRS and GPS have used their program funds to purchase trusted microelectronics through the TAPO when the resources needed by those programs exceeded the capabilities provided within the Trusted Foundry Program.

*Question.* Does the current budget request fiscal year 2010 support the majority of pending projects that are proposed to use Trusted Foundry services?

*Answer.* No. Recent estimates are that the DOD purchases about \$3–5 billion in integrated circuits per year. Based on the cyber-threats and direct threats to our systems from counterfeit and tampered parts, we believe that all of those should be trusted. The current 2010 budget request is based on the projected needs for the

few programs that have requested support for obtaining trusted parts. The majority of programs are not yet in full compliance with the Secretary's directive-type memo that calls for full scale implementation of trusted components for our systems. The Trusted Foundry Program is making a concerted effort to align program offices and services with the ability to obtain trusted components from trusted sources.

*Question.* If Congress were to provide additional funding for the Trusted Foundry Program above the President's fiscal year 2009 request, what additional capacity or services would be your highest priority?

*Answer.* The priorities of an expanded program are to establish direct contracts with all of the trusted foundries and suppliers to provide trusted parts, drive new leading-edge technologies into the Trusted Foundry, and provide additional fabrication runs for defense programs.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

*Question.* How, if at all, has the Department of Defense turned to the interagency process to provide rule-of-law training in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Working to reduce corruption in Afghanistan has been a U.S. Government objective from the beginning. The principal Department of Defense efforts to reduce corruption include the Department's training and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces and personnel of the associated Afghan ministries. These efforts support and are supported by other U.S. Government agency efforts to reduce corruption. For example, USAID anti-corruption efforts include training Afghan judges and judicial staff and restructuring personnel and pay structures in the Afghan court system.

*Question.* Please provide the following: The total number of lawyers (military and civilian) whose primary responsibility is to provide rule-of-law training in Afghanistan on behalf of the Department of Defense; the offices within the Department of Defense (or United States Government) or organization to which these individuals are assigned; the total number of Afghanis who have received rule-of-law training from these individuals; an estimate of the total number of Afghanis for which the Department of Defense anticipates it will provide rule-of-law training.

*Answer.* The lead U.S. agency for rule-of-law and other governance development initiatives is the Department of State. There are no military or civilian lawyers providing rule-of-law training as a primary duty on behalf of the Department of Defense.

*Question.* The President's policy towards Afghanistan notes that part of our counter-insurgency strategy must include building effective local governance.

What is the Department of Defense's plan for combating corruption in the Afghan government entities with which it works on a regular basis, including the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police?

*Answer.* The Department works to reduce corruption in Afghanistan principally through training, mentoring, and partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces and the associated Afghan ministries. The training and mentoring programs ensure that Afghan National Army soldiers and officers, Afghan National Police (ANP) officers, and ministry staff understand the potential impact that corrupt practices could have on the population. Partnering with ANP units that have completed the Focused District Development program conducted by International Security Assistance Force units, U.S. and Coalition personnel seek to ensure that ANP officers do not return to corrupt practices. Indirectly, counternarcotics efforts by the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies will help reduce corruption by removing a source of funding for corrupt practices.

*Question.* What office or offices within the Department of Defense are responsible for anti-corruption policies that the Department of Defense will apply when working with Afghan government entities?

*Answer.* The Department of State is responsible for rule-of-law and anti-corruption policies at the national level. The Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan develops training and mentoring programs and curricula for the Afghan National Security Forces and the relevant ministries in support of U.S. rule-of-law and anti-corruption policies.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

## CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY MISSION AND WIND POWER

*Question.* Earlier this year, my Senate colleagues and I wrote to you to request a more coordinated response to conflicts between the military mission and wind power. Please let me know when we can expect an answer to our request.

*Answer.* The Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) with responding to the Senator's letter. The response required extensive coordination within the Department because mapping areas feasible for energy development impacts DOD missions and training. It is not simply an issue of the Department's obtaining or using energy. The USD(AT&L) response, which is attached, was finalized and sent on August 13, 2009.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
*Washington, DC, August 13, 2009.*

Hon. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,  
*U.S. Senate,*  
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you for your May 14 letter to the Secretary of Defense requesting the Department of Defense (DOD) establish clear policy to support renewable energy development projects while maintaining necessary protections for military airspace. I am responding on behalf of the Secretary.

The Department has set ambitious goals for the use of renewable energy and is aggressively pursuing efforts on military bases across the Nation. By 2025, the Department plans to procure or produce the equivalent of 25 percent of the electricity it consumes from renewable sources. The national security challenges posed by reliance on foreign sources of energy are clear, and the transition to renewable sources is a key element of the DOD strategy to respond.

As you know, the Department must balance goals to increase renewable energy with maintenance of critical testing, training and homeland defense capabilities. Some renewable energy projects on or near military installations or surveillance radars can have substantial adverse effects on DOD test and training ranges, training routes, special use airspace, and our air defense and border surveillance assets.

You offered suggestions in two broad areas, one of which being the process by which proposals for renewable energy projects get reviewed. For the very reasons you cited, the Department must evaluate each proposed project on an individual, site-specific basis. The Department's red-yellow-green maps are intended to serve merely as guides. In practice, each proposal must be assessed on the basis of the specific factors such as the physical characteristics of the proposed construction, training, test and surveillance needs, and the local geography. For this reason, it is not feasible to fully centralize decision making on wind development projects. However, my staff will work with other offices in the Department to review the current, decentralized decision process and recommend ways to expedite it and improve transparency.

You also suggested that better technology can help mitigate the limitations on placement of wind energy projects. The Department is conducting flight trials and analytic studies to develop tools to improve prediction of impacts and explore possible mitigations. My staff will explore how we might accelerate development of technical mitigation approaches.

I appreciate your suggestions for ways in which the Department can improve the prospects for the development of wind energy in particular. I share your view that the U.S. Government needs to take the steps necessary to allow our country to exploit the benefits of wind energy generation without compromising national security.

A similar letter has been sent to the other signatories of your letter. I look forward to working with you to address this challenge.

Sincerely,

ASHTON B. CARTER.

*Question.* As you know, there is a great deal of potential and interest in producing significant amounts of solar electricity on military bases in southern California. At least three bases are considering significant projects, which could make the bases independent of the power grid, combat global warming, and increase our energy security. These efforts are often the result of serious initiative by good base commanders and other people in uniform. (1) What is the Pentagon doing to facilitate the use of solar power on military bases in Southern California? (2) What resources and personnel have you dedicated to this effort? (3) What coordination is occurring between services? (4) Would you consider setting a goal that Southern California

bases should attempt to produce enough solar power on base that they are able to meet or exceed all of their net energy needs?

Answer. What is the Pentagon doing to facilitate the use of solar power on military bases in Southern California? The abundance of available solar energy presents opportunities for the Department of Defense (DOD) to increase the energy security of military bases in California. DOD is employing photovoltaic technologies at many installations in California using Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP) funding. Using 2008 and 2009 funds (including funds appropriated in the ARRA), DOD is designing and constructing more than 30 solar projects, including thermal systems for domestic hot water, heating pools, and photovoltaics on roofs to provide building power for a variety of operational needs. In addition to carrying out solar technology applications tailored toward specific buildings, DOD is exploring large, utility-scale solar energy plants in partnership with utility companies and energy developers. For example, the Army recently selected its commercial partners for a project at Fort Irwin that could ultimately provide 500 MW of solar power. Finally, DOD envisions military installations can serve as testbeds for renewable energy technologies that are not yet commercially feasible, including, but not limited to, solar technologies, and we are talking with the Department of Energy (DOE) about potential opportunities.

Note, however, that some proposed large-scale commercial solar development projects, including projects that would be located on land adjacent to military installations, may be incompatible with the military's mission. For example, solar towers can obstruct flight operations and interfere with radar. Photovoltaic arrays can also impact testing and training by degrading habitat for threatened and endangered species. Thus, we must carefully evaluate the impact of these proposed projects. Still, we are committed to transparency wherever possible, and we will try to provide information to stakeholders as early in the process as possible.

What resources and personnel have you dedicated to this effort? Each installation has an energy manager, and many installations have a Resource Efficiency Manager (REM) who works with the installation's engineering and operations staffs to determine which renewable energy technologies can be employed to satisfy installation energy requirements. In addition, the installation-level staff relies on the energy subject matter experts at major commands and field-operating agencies to verify the technical solutions and then authorize a contracting method to implement those solutions. Finally, the military services work closely with the Department of Energy Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). Drawing on the vast expertise of the DOE's many laboratories, FEMP provides technical assistance to individual installations. FEMP also provides enterprise-wide solutions in areas like utility contracting, power purchase agreements, and utility-scale renewable energy development.

What coordination is occurring between services? Installation-energy issues are coordinated through the Defense Energy Working Group (DEWG), which is chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)), Dr. Dorothy Robyn. Members of the DEWG include the senior military service officials responsible for installations and energy and the services' chief engineers. The DEWG has met monthly since November 2008, and it has proved to be an invaluable forum. Among other things, the DEWG is trying to identify and reduce key impediments to expanded development of renewable energy at military installations. Complementing the DEWG (and with many of the same members) is the Energy Infrastructure Compatibility Working Group, which focuses on potential encroachment issues, particularly on the ranges used for military training and testing. For example, this group worked with Interior's Bureau of Land Management to draft a Wind Energy Protocol that defines a process for DOD evaluation of proposed wind projects on BLM lands. DOD and Interior are exploring the expansion of the protocol to include solar energy.

Would you consider setting a goal that Southern California bases should attempt to produce enough solar power on base that they are able to meet or exceed all of their net energy needs? For a variety of reasons, it would be premature to set a solar or renewable energy goal for Southern California bases beyond those established in law today. To review, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 establishes as a goal that Federal agencies produce or purchase 3 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2007–2009, 5 percent by 2010–2012, and 7.5 percent by 2013. Moreover, in November 2005, DOD established as an internal goal that it would produce or procure 25 percent of its facilities energy from renewable sources by 2025. This 25-percent goal was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007. Nevertheless, even these goals represent a challenge, because key technologies are not yet commercially mature or cost-competitive, and, in some cases, mission needs may preclude their use at a particular military installation. In sum,



while we plan to be aggressive in pursuing opportunities for greater reliance on renewable energy, we want to be cost effective and consistent with mission needs.

*Question.* It is my understanding that there are fuel cell technologies that may meet the emerging requirements of the military. Solid oxide fuel cell systems generate clean, cost-effective, onsite electricity that (1) eliminates dependence on the power grid, (2) uses significantly less fuel than traditional generators, and (3) would improve our overall security posture through reliance on domestic fuel sources.

Have you considered including these options to our military energy portfolio as a way to increase energy security?

*Answer.* Yes. The Army's Research, Development and Engineering Command, along with DARPA and DOE, is evaluating solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) technology for military uses. Specifically, they are looking at how SOFC systems can be used at installations and forward operating locations in conjunction with other fuel cell technologies (e.g., reformed methanol and direct methanol) to deliver power to a 250 W battery charger fueled by JP-8. However, in spite of the promising advances in recent years, the successful development of a militarized SOFC for a battery charger is probably some years away.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

*Question.* Secretary Gates, I understand the Department intends to reduce its reliance on contracted workers by hiring more than 13,000 government civilians to replace contractors. Has the Department identified what positions or functions it intends to in-source, and what savings do you anticipate achieving through this initiative?

*Answer.* The Department is currently working to identify the specific positions that will be insourced. This identification is not constrained to specific functional communities although the Department does have a focus on the acquisition workforce and functions that have been determined to be inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, or will increase government oversight. The Department has budgeted for 40 percent savings efficiency from the conversion of these support contractors to civil servants.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the cost of providing contracted healthcare for our military beneficiaries and their families has increased substantially in the past 5 years, and shows no sign of decreasing in the near future. As the Department looks to in-source throughout the Department, is there consideration for increasing capacity for care in military clinics and hospitals to reduce the need and the associated cost of contracted care?

*Answer.* While the cost of providing care for military beneficiaries has certainly escalated in the past several years, it is important to point out the cost increase has been across the Military Health System (MHS) and not just in the Purchased Care Sector. Much of the increase in cost can be attributed to a significant increase in the total number of beneficiaries within the MHS and an expansion of the TRICARE benefit. Having said this, however, most of the cost and workload increase has indeed been seen in the Purchased Care Sector. This has been well recognized by MHS leadership and broad-based efforts are underway to both optimize access to military treatment facilities (MTFs) and the Direct Care Sector and to improve the efficiency and quality of the healthcare experience within facilities. Each of the services has addressed the issue head on.

The Army's "Access To Care Initiative," the Navy's "Patient Centered Medical Home" projects at National Naval Medical Center and San Diego, and the Air Force's innovative "Family Health Initiative" are all excellent examples of the commitment each of the services have made to improving the healthcare experience of beneficiaries and maximizing MTF enrollment within existing capacity and budget. So far, these initiatives have demonstrated early success and the Department hopes to capitalize on these successes to improve performance throughout the system. In addition, Health Affairs/TRICARE Management Activity has piloted a "Pay for Performance" project that has been engineered to incentivize individual MTFs to optimize efforts to improve healthcare quality, access, continuity, and patient satisfaction. Again, the purpose is to stimulate innovation, highlight best practices, and promote their adoption across the MHS.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, you and Secretary Clinton supported transferring the "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" to the State Department over the next 2 years. What efforts are underway within the interagency to implement this initiative, and where would you like to see the fiscal year 2010 funding appropriated?

*Answer.* For fiscal year 2010, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) has been appropriated to the Department of State in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009. The Department of Defense is working with the Department of State to build its capacity to manage a wartime program in support of DOD requirements, and needs to ensure that the Department of State has the authorities, resources, and processes necessary to provide our commanders the flexibility sought under PCCF. DOD and the Department of State will work together over the coming months and year to make sure the transfer of management responsibility to the Department of State takes place without any degradation of the support required by DOD to build Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities in support of U.S. forces' efforts in Afghanistan.

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, can you give us your thoughts on how the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund will help secure Pakistan's tribal areas, and what actions may be necessary to improve the interagency coordination so these funds are used effectively?

*Answer.* The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) focuses on building enduring capabilities for the Pakistani military to conduct counterinsurgency operations in support of U.S. efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The funding is designed to accelerate development of the Government of Pakistan's capacity to secure its borders, including the tribal areas, deny safe haven to extremists, and provide security for the indigenous population in the border areas with Afghanistan.

PCCF will fund counterinsurgency requirements such as helicopters, soldier equipment, and training. The Department proposed \$400 million for PCCF in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental and \$700 million in the fiscal year 2010 overseas contingency operations request. We are grateful to Congress for supporting our request for \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) in fiscal year 2009.

For fiscal year 2010, we have requested a clean transfer to DOD of the \$700 million Congress provided to the Department of State to ensure uninterrupted execution of this crucial program while the Departments work closely on developing plans for the Department of State to implement the program in fiscal year 2011.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

*Question.* Recently, it was announced that a heavy armor brigade from Europe will not go to White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, as originally planned. Will DOD be giving serious consideration to sending that brigade to Fort Knox? If not, why not?

*Answer.* Senator, the Army released the Grow the Army Stationing Plan in December 2007 after it was approved by the Department of Defense and the President. We will adhere to the same plan once the Quadrennial Defense Review determines force structure end state in Europe. The criteria we would use for a returning Germany brigade would be similar to the criteria we used in December 2007.

*Question.* What criteria or requirements will be evaluated in order to match resources and capabilities of installations with the returning heavy armor brigade?

*Answer.* The same criteria will be considered in this decision as was used in the installation analysis for Grow the Army 2007: Maximizing Army installation capabilities; growth capacity; power projection; training; and quality of life. The Base Realignment and Closure 2005 Military Value Model will also be used for computation. Other factors that will be considered include minimizing community impact and disruption to the current plan, while maintaining flexibility for future force mix decisions. Our final stationing decision will reflect the results of analysis and best Military Judgment.

*Question.* Section 8119 of Public Law 110-116 provides in relevant part that: "(b) REPORT—(1) Not later than December 31, 2007, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the parties described in paragraph (2) a report on the progress of the Department of Defense toward compliance with this section . . . (3) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the updated and projected annual funding levels necessary to achieve full compliance with this section. The projected funding levels for each report shall include a detailed accounting of the complete life-cycle costs for each of the chemical disposal projects . . ." In its latest report to Congress, the Department did not include funding totals for the out-years for the Blue Grass Army Depot and Pueblo Depot in contravention of this provision. It only included the fiscal year 2010 request figures.

Why was this long-term budget information not included? What was the Department's legal rationale for not including these funding levels? How does this comport with President Obama's promise "not to nullify or undermine Congressional instruc-

tions as enacted into law?" Please provide all of the info required by Section 8119 of Public Law 110-116.

Answer. The Department did not finalize the outyear estimate when the fiscal year 2010 Presidents budget plan was formulated. The outyear programs and funding will not be settled until completion of Quadrennial Defense Review and the follow-on program and budget review later this year.

DOD fully supports President Obama's promise, and doing the legislatively-mandated QDR does not "nullify or undermine Congressional instructions as enacted into law."

We will provide the information required by Section 8119 as soon as we can.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

*Question.* Iran's leadership uses despicable rhetoric regarding Israel, continues its support for international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and disregards the international community's concerns over its efforts to obtaining nuclear power and possibly weapons. It seems clear that the regional effect of these actions will be destabilizing in an area of the world vital for U.S. strategic interests.

I want to ask your opinion on the possible change in Iran's attitude, if any, based on the outcome of last week's presidential elections. Do you believe there is any chance that a change in leadership would temper their growing sense of regional importance and detrimental national pride? Would a second term with Ahmadenijad at the helm cause further military concern in the region based on his rhetoric and the state's support of terrorist groups in the region?

Answer. We are watching the events in Iran very closely. Regardless of how the current political dispute is resolved, U.S. and international concerns about Iran's nuclear program and support for terrorism remain unchanged and DOD will continue to focus on steps required to safeguard U.S. security interests.

*Question.* There has been a great deal of discussion as of late over cyber security. May I commend you for the active and engaged role that the DOD is taking in recognizing and addressing the very real threats posed by cyber security attacks. Having chaired the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem (Y2K Committee), I am convinced that a significant national security threat exists. It is clearly short-sighted to suppose that by increasing funding for one year that we will solve all current and future problems. Because threats will evolve, so must our responses. This then would call in to question not so much our individual responses to cyber threats, but the system put in place to address them. Can you describe current efforts to effectively structure the systems that will determine how to secure cyberspace?

Answer. The Department has taken steps to address risk effectively, and ensure our freedom of action in cyberspace. The Department recently established USCYBERCOMMAND, a subunified command under USSTRATCOM. As part of that effort we are reviewing all cyberspace policy and strategy to develop a comprehensive approach to DOD cyberspace operations. Additionally, we are currently reviewing how we acquire information technology (IT) systems within the Department. The end result of the establishment of USCYBERCOMMAND and the policy, strategy and acquisition reviews currently underway will determine how the Department secures cyberspace for our operations.

*Question.* One of the tests of the new administration's cyber security policy is whether it can move beyond what some say has been outdated or inadequate thinking that had permeated previous debate. Can you describe the right balance in determining the proper role of government intervention so that it does not impose too much bureaucracy on the private sector, but still offers sufficient protection of government resources and assets, especially defense assets?

Answer. An example of creating the right balance is the Department's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program. The DIB CS/IA program was established in September 2007 by the Department to partner with cleared defense contractors to secure critical unclassified DOD information resident on, or transiting, DIB unclassified systems and networks. This DOD-DIB partnering model provides the mechanism to exchange relevant cyber threat and vulnerability information in a timely manner, provides intelligence and digital forensic analysis on threats, supports damage assessments for compromised information, and expands government-to-industry cooperation, while ensuring that industry equities and privacy are protected.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

## INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, our troops entered Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. We soon realized that the threat environment for our military operations was quite different than what we were prepared and equipped for. We responded by rapidly developing and fielding thousands of anti-IED jammers, more than 16,000 mine resistant ambush protective vehicles and countless intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. All of these programs have saved American lives, yet none of them are Programs of Record and they are all managed outside of the traditional Defense Department bureaucracy. Why was it necessary to go outside of the regular Department of Defense acquisition process? And how can we institutionalize these capabilities instead of continuously adding more layers to the bureaucracy?

*Answer.* The experiences of MRAP, the rapid fielding of Army's Task Force Odin and other ISR capabilities into theater, and the UAS "max capacity" push (more Predators/Global Hawk Block 10s) were invaluable. These exceptional efforts were successful because we prioritized requirements and expedited traditional processes to obtain the agility and responsiveness required for wartime acquisition. Several of these initiatives now are programs of record or transitioning to programs of record.

We are working to institutionalize the procurement of urgently-needed resources in wartime to meet current and future requirements. At Congressional request, GAO and the Defense Science Board (DSB) are currently looking at this problem and we look forward to their recommendations for improvement. The rapid acquisition, deployment, and sustainment activities must be harmonized. Additionally, the Department must balance the need for high-tech and low-tech equipment solutions, while institutionalizing processes and procedures that field capabilities quickly and efficiently, when and where needed.

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, one of the reasons our acquisition system is so cumbersome and inflexible lies in requirements that often demand gold-plated solutions that can take years to develop. Many of the rapid fielding capabilities we're now sending to theater may only represent a 75 percent solution, but collectively, they seem to get the job done. What is your assessment of the new equipment we've been sending into theater? Are we addressing our warfighters' needs?

*Answer.* In general, the new equipment fielded has had a huge impact in theater, especially in Iraq. The Department is capitalizing on the wartime procurement lessons learned so that Afghanistan can benefit from these experiences. Much of the rapidly, urgently fielded ISR, C2, UAS, force protection, and Counter-IED capabilities are typically low-cost, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or slightly modified-COTS solutions. The short, time-certain need period is a determinant factor. The speed of development and production is increasingly important. Our focus is to improve our ability to anticipate requirements and therefore minimize the need for partial solutions.

## IRREGULAR WARFARE

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, roughly 6 months ago, your office issued guidance declaring irregular warfare to be as "strategically important as traditional warfare". You state that the fiscal year 2010 budget rebalances capabilities and provides roughly 10 percent for irregular warfare, 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and 40 percent for dual-use capabilities. However, with no out-year budget data and no movement by the military services to significantly adapt doctrine and training, how can the Committee be assured that "irregular warfare" is not just a convenient way to cut programs or justify new programs?

*Answer.* Recent conflicts around the world highlight how irregular warfare is increasingly being employed against conventional military forces, and I am absolutely certain that irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts. I see joint doctrine, education and training adapting accordingly; we have new doctrine in counterinsurgency, stability operations, security force assistance (amongst others) on-line and coming on-line, near-term. IW has also been a specific emphasis area of mine in both joint education and training for a number of years. I fully support the balance between conventional, dual-use, and irregular capabilities in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request. The program decisions in this budget request emphasize our people first, while balance our efforts by addressing the fights we are in and most likely to encounter again without sacrificing conventional capability. That balance helps to check programs that have exceeded their original design, improve effi-

ciency, and steward the resources taxpayers provide us for the common defense. I am confident that this balance not only preserves our war fighting edge but also inject the flexibility required to address today's most relevant challenges.

*Question.* How will you ensure that the military services will not scale back their full spectrum readiness training too much, so that we can continue to dominate and prevail in major combat operations?

*Answer.* We acknowledge adjusting joint force combat capabilities and capacities to provide greater emphasis on fighting irregular forces potentially risks reducing combat capabilities and capacities with respect to regular forces, a less likely but potentially more dangerous security threat. This risk will be mitigated to the extent that combat capabilities and organizations are designed from the outset for maximum versatility and specialized capabilities essential for success against regular forces or for deterrence are preserved. It can also be mitigated by the development and application of training techniques and technologies that help leaders and their subordinates master new skills more quickly than more traditional training methods. There are processes in place for the service chiefs and combatant commanders to provide annual comprehensive assessments of their ability to meet Title 10 and Unified Command Plan responsibilities including the entire range of military operations. The Department's readiness reporting processes assess readiness to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy across the entire set of NMS missions, and are based largely on information reported by the services and combatant commands. Decreases in preparedness for major combat operations caused by increasing IW preparedness would be evident through reporting by the combatant commanders and service chiefs, and managed appropriately. Lastly, Congress receives the Quarterly Readiness Report produced by OSD in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the services.

#### ACQUISITION REFORM—REQUIREMENTS

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, as we look at improving the acquisition system due to massive cost overruns and schedule delays, perhaps we should think about the way that weapon system requirements are generated and validated. It appears that too often, "requirements creep", or reaching for immature technologies makes programs too costly and off-schedule. How can the Department better manage requirements, and perhaps change the service cultures, so that acquisition programs are more likely to provide needed capabilities on time and on cost?

*Answer.* The Department is committed to improve systems acquisition performance. We must generate greater agility and responsiveness in our acquisition system, especially wartime procurements and foreign military sales. The Department made a number of key revisions to its acquisition policies and procedures. It is important to institutionalize these changes with discipline and better measures of effectiveness.

Part of improving the acquisition process is improving the front end of the process—our requirements definition. To improve overall performance, the Joint Staff has implemented Requirements Management training for all those who occupy positions of responsibility in defining and vetting requirements documents. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has also continued to refine its processes and aims to establish well defined, realistic requirements. To improve this process, the JROC has focused and streamlined the capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to ensure it provides an appropriate definition of capability needs to support a decision for a material solution and the warfighter defined requirements to be met. In order to provide the warfighter an increased role in the requirements process, the JROC has begun to experiment with delegation of Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) authority to appropriate functional combatant commands (JFCOM for C2 and SOCOM for special operations related capabilities). The JROC is continuing to evaluate this delegation of JCB authorities and will next look at delegation to TRANSCOM for logistics capabilities and STRATCOM for net-centric and battlespace awareness capabilities. The JROC has updated its instruction and procedures to provide additional direction delineating capabilities the JROC must approve to ensure they receive appropriate oversight without undue delay. Finally, the JROC is working to fully implement the provisions and changed enacted in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.

*Question.* Do you believe that your staff has the analytic support, such as modeling and simulation tools, for objective analysis to help prioritize requirements?

*Answer.* The Joint Staff has adequate analytical support both in terms of qualitative methods (human in the loop war gaming capabilities) and quantitative methods (modeling and simulation capabilities) to validate assumptions and outcomes. These analytic tools help frame the front end of the requirements development proc-

ess and feed into Capability Based Assessments which are conducted to assess and prioritize specific capability gaps.

*Question.* What improvements or changes would you recommend in order to better manage requirements?

*Answer.* We are continuously evaluating methods to streamline the management of requirements. To that end, we have made recent changes in the requirements development and management process.

- We are limiting the number of documents that must go through joint review and oversight to those that impact joint operations.
- We have provided guidance to better scope the analysis done in the capability gap assessment process. This will reduce time and resources required while presenting an appropriately defined requirements gap to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for validation. This will allow the Department to move more quickly from the requirements process into the acquisition process.
- We have recognized that information technology systems need to have a more flexible requirements management process than traditional hardware programs. To address this, we have better tailored the requirements process as it applies to information technology systems. Once the JROC approves the initial performance requirements and provides overarching cost and schedule constraints, it will delegate requirements management and oversight to an appropriate Flag level body that has the time and flexibility to effectively manage the development of these systems.

We are also working on future improvements to the requirements management process:

- We are developing an information technology data management tool which will allow us to structure the data in requirements documents to make the information more readily available and visible for comparison and analysis.
- We are developing a similar tool for managing joint urgent needs to allow for more rapid information sharing so that we can make decisions more rapidly and get solutions into the hands of the warfighter more quickly.

We will continue to identify opportunities to improve the requirements management process to ensure we provide the correct level of oversight balanced with the ability to respond efficiently to the warfighter's needs.

#### STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAM TERMINATIONS

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, we understand that the fiscal year 2010 budget is a step towards rebalancing resources to build irregular warfare capacity applicable to the current fight. But we still face threats from traditional nation states such as North Korea and potentially Iran or others. How do program terminations such as the F-22, C-17 and Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicle affect our ability to respond to traditional threats? Are we swinging the pendulum too far the other way?

*Answer.* I don't think the President's fiscal year 2010 budget (PB-10) swings the pendulum too far away from traditional threats. PB-10 provides a rebalancing of the Department's programs in order to enhance our capability to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead. This rebalancing also provides a hedge against other risks and contingencies. Last year's National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. PB-10 focused on what programs are necessary to deter aggression, project power when necessary, and protect our interests and allies around the globe.

#### DE-MILITARIZING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, earlier this year, you suggested that the military should be "brave enough not to lead" when it comes to foreign policy. Can you elaborate on that concept for us?

*Answer.* We have learned from the past 7 years of war that we serve this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated approach that employs all elements of power to achieve the policy goals set forth by our civilian leaders. The lead agent of U.S. diplomacy and development should be the State Department, which obviously requires the backing of a robust military and a strong economy. As we win the wars we are fighting and restore the health of our Armed Forces, the military's approach will increasingly support our diplomatic counterparts through the persistent engagement required to build networks of capable partners. Integrated with these partners and the interagency and non-governmental organizations, we will more successfully protect the citizens of this Nation.

## GROUND-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE (ALASKA INTERCEPTORS)

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, the Department's budget request would effectively stop the emplacement of ground-based interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska. Has the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland changed to warrant curtailing this program?

*Answer.* The threat of long-range ballistic missile attacks by rogue states, such as North Korea today and Iran in the near-future, remain a threat to the U.S. homeland. The fiscal year 2010 budget adequately addresses the current North Korean threat and provides limited protection against future threats from the Middle East.

## FISCAL YEAR 2010 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS REQUEST

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, how will you ensure that urgent, unforeseen warfighter requirements are addressed in the fiscal year 2010 overseas contingency operations budget? Can you assure us that the Committee will be informed of any necessary adjustments?

*Answer.* We built the fiscal year 2010 overseas contingency operations budget with the best information available. The new administration provided us with the decisions necessary to produce estimates reflective of the current policies of the United States for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010.

However, changing conditions on the ground and the commander's assessment of needs to prevail in the operations could drive the requirement for changes in force structure or in other areas that would compel the Department to make adjustments to the budget. We ask for your support of legislative proposals that would increase our flexibility for responding to these types of adjustments. Legislative proposals such as raising the threshold level for urgent minor construction, expanding or continuing train/equip authorities, and continuing or expanding authority for the transfer of equipment to the Iraqi/Afghan security forces increase our flexibility and are essential to the successful conduct of the operations. Should we experience significant urgent, unforeseen requirements we cannot resolve on our own, we will work with the administration to inform the committee as appropriate.

## STRAIN ON THE FORCE

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, the Army's and Marine Corps' suicide and divorce rates have risen sharply this past year. It appears that the strain of frequent deployments is affecting the emotional health of our soldiers and Marines. Do you believe the Department is doing enough to support service members and their families? What more could we do?

*Answer.* The high suicide rates are a sobering gauge of challenges currently facing all the services. Failed relationships, alcohol abuse, legal, financial and occupational difficulties all remain established risk factors for suicide. We know that high mission tempo associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, increased deployment lengths, repeated deployments and limited downtime between deployments are all associated with increased mental health issues. We believe that combat deployments, combat stress and suicide rates are all very much related, although analytical data citing this direct correlation is not yet available.

In response to this belief, we are actively engaged in efforts to reduce the stress on the force and their families by increasing dwell time at home between deployments. Over the next 18–24 months, we anticipate a move toward 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed for our active duty forces and 5 years at home for every one year deployed for our reserve component forces.

Meanwhile, the services are actively engaged in educating service members and leaders at all levels on suicide prevention, and programs targeting risk factors and incorporating protective factors have been instituted. Joint initiatives, such as the establishment of the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury and the DOD Suicide Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee provide infrastructure to assess, validate, oversee and facilitate best practice prevention, resilience, identification, treatment, outreach, rehabilitation and reintegration programs to ensure we meet the needs of the Nation's military communities.

The military has made large strides to provide improved and increased mental health support for service members and families. Each service has been addressing this issue since 2003, most actively since 2007. DOD has made sufficient funding available to meet the psychological health requirements as currently established by OSD(HA) and the services through 2010. We have increased military/civilian mental

health provider numbers by 75 percent and network mental health providers by 25 percent since 2001.

Despite these overall increases in mental health provider staffing to support our military communities, shortfalls remain. Although the services are funded, a shortfall of nearly 1,000 additional mental health providers is reported across the services this year. Complicating this shortfall is the similar overall shortage of providers in the civilian sector, as well as difficulty hiring clinicians for the relatively remote locations of the posts, camps, and installations where service members and their families reside. Numerous mental health recruitment and retention staffing initiatives continue in order to try to fill this gap, including direct hire authority of civilians, scholarships, critical skills retention bonuses and loan repayment programs. However, dedicated efforts to address our military health system's current distribution/utilization of mental health personnel, staffing models, standard of care and practice issues and manpower accounting capabilities must be further examined and modified where required.

Senator Inouye, your sponsorship of significant telemedicine legislation and research is greatly appreciated. We are striving to leverage these assets.

Because of the nature of the problem and the number of service members affected, the medical community alone will not succeed without increased leadership emphasis targeting prevention and cultural change. A continued concerted effort is required to first identify and then successfully reverse the root causes of the complex issues we confront as well as fighting the mental health stigma at every level. I do not consider the elimination of mental health stigma to be a health issue, but a leadership issue. I am determined to change our culture and assure you this is a top priority.

*Question.* The Army and Marine Corps have now both completed their planned end strength growth. Do you believe that the Army and Marine Corps force structure is large enough to relieve the operational strain on the force?

*Answer.* The Army and Marine Corps force structure will be large enough to relieve the operational strain on the force when, in the Army's case, the 22,000 personnel are fully accessed and trained. With respect to the Marine Corps, the authorized 202,000 active duty end strength is sufficient to meet 1:2 Active Duty dwell and 1:5 Reserve Force dwell in the mid-term.

The Army sought and received a temporary increase of up to 22,000 personnel in end strength to alleviate the continued pressure of global demands. This increase will serve to relieve the strain on the force by improving the Army's ability to fill deploying units (both BCTs and enablers) in order to offset increasing non-deployable rates (13 percent in 2009, primarily medical conditions) and the elimination of the Stop Loss program.

Additionally, when fully implemented, the temporary increase will improve the strength of units in RESET by achieving over 100 percent authorized strength for TRAIN/READY units to provide more units with deployable strength at or above 93 percent.

Up to 2,000 of the 22,000 will be focused on officer increases (through retiree recalls) and NCO increases (retention actions and retiree recalls) with the priority for the retiree recalls to fill/offset Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS) requirements.

The Army's decision to seek the full 22,000 temporary increase will be based on detailed analysis of the demand assumptions projected for summer 2010 and the impact on readiness of the first 15,000 of the temporary end-strength increase which will be complete by September, 2010.

With respect to force readiness, the improvement in readiness will be incremental as we bring increasing numbers of the 22,000 into the force. The first priority is to increase deployer fill. We have determined the priority Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and training base capacity allowing us to impact those units with goal of bringing the first 5,000 on by the end of the fiscal year.

The transition to the Afghanistan-focused CENTCOM theater campaign plan before a sufficiently reduced demand for forces in Iraq impacted the overall demand for Army forces. Of the 43 Active Component Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), all are either committed to global operations, in transit to those operations, in Army force regeneration, RESET, or training phases with a Boots-On-Ground (BOG) to dwell ratio of 1:1.4. The Army's manning guidance for deploying BCTs is to man to 105 percent assigned strength in order to attain 95 percent deployed strength. U.S. Army in coordination with CENTCOM guidance deploys all combat arms forces at or above 90 percent deployed strength. Deploying units that do not achieve a manning level of 90 percent at Latest Arrival Date (LAD) plus 30 days must "deploy by exception" as approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army.



## AGE AND HEALTH OF TANKER FLEET

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, I am concerned about the aging Air Force tanker fleet and the health and age of the KC-135 tankers by the time they are replaced. Can you update the Committee on the status of the Air Force tanker fleet, including the age of the fleet and any present safety and flight concerns with the current fleet?

*Answer.* Our current Air Force tanker fleet has been operating without readiness issues, but with the age of KC-135s averaging 48 years, future operational availability will depend on flight hours and usage patterns.

## SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM)

*Question.* Admiral Mullen, the Commander of the Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson, recently stated that escalating requirements for capabilities provided by Special Operations Forces have outpaced SOCOM's ability to train new personnel and develop critical enablers in the areas of aviation, intelligence, and communications. To mitigate these shortfalls, Admiral Olson has requested that the military services provide Special Operations Command with additional assistance and manpower in these critical support areas. Are the services able to meet these additional requirements? How will this plan be managed, and to what degree has it been incorporated in the fiscal year 2010 budget request?

*Answer.* Through the generous support of Congress, the services have been able to meet the additional requirements for conventional support to special operations. In limited situations, the services have supported special operations requests with "ad hoc" solutions and by detailing "in lieu of" manpower or assets to assist. Looking forward, achieving the Grow the Force Initiatives in the Army and Marine Corps and the significant increases in ISR and rotary wing aviation training requested in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget will ensure critical conventional force enablers to special operations forces are provided to support current conflicts and prepare for future challenges.

*Question.* Funding for Special Operations Command has grown from \$2.1 billion in 2001 to nearly \$8.6 billion, including supplemental funding, in fiscal year 2010. During this same time period Special Operations Command's mission has grown exponentially, as evidenced most recently by its designation as the DOD Proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA). Given this rapid growth in both budget and responsibility, how are you ensuring programmatic and fiscal accountability within Special Operations Command?

*Answer.* Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has developed rigorous strategic planning, programming, budgeting and execution processes. The command submits its program for Special Operations Forces (SOF)-peculiar requirements, funded through defense-wide appropriations lines, directly to the Department, in much the same way the services do. While the four component commands work their SOF-peculiar requirements through SOCOM's processes, they must also work through their individual parent services to ensure the approval and resourcing of service-common requirements.

Commander, SOCOM has taken several steps since 2001 to help ensure effective stewardship of appropriated funding. SOCOM has not only increased the number of military and civilian financial management personnel who execute and oversee resources, and in June 2008, the commander made the financial management function a stand-alone center, and the Comptroller reports directly to him.

Specifically, there are several programs and processes in place to help command financial managers maintain visibility over the command's SOF-peculiar Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding. The command established a quarterly resourcing process, the Joint Resources Management Program (JRMP) with the Deputy Commander as the final decision-making authority. Further, the component command and the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) comptrollers participate in the allocation of SOCOM's funding. The JRMP oversees all MFP-11 resources; this year, the process was more closely aligned with the command's Center for Acquisition and Logistics, and includes quarterly execution reviews of all procurement and RDTE programs.

The command has established controls to reasonably ensure that obligations and costs are in compliance with any applicable laws; its funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation; and they properly record and account for revenues and expenditures.

Finally, SOCOM uses accounting processes and tools to provide additional visibility over the use of MFP-11 funds, and to help identify potential abnormalities during execution. These include: the analysis of the monthly Appropriation Status FY Programs and Subaccounts Report (AR(M)1002); Tri-Annual Reviews (TARs), which require financial analysts to formally review all open documents to determine

validity of funds obligated and committed, and de-obligates for other purposes those that are not valid; electronic databases such as the Financial Information System that provide command personnel with real-time fund status; and the Defense Departmental Reporting System, which provides SOCOM's official financial reports and Auditable Financial Statements.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

*Question.* In 2008, the Department of Defense's Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) began its "Afghan National Army Legal Development Program" in response to a request for rule-of-law training from the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan. Approximately eight Afghanis were trained to be the trainers for future Afghan Legal Advisor training programs. In March 2009, the first course, taught by these trainers trained 50 Afghan National Army and Afghan Ministry of Defense legal advisors on various aspects of the "rule of law."

What is the Department of Defense's comprehensive plan to ensure that its rule-of-law training in Afghanistan is conducted in a consistent, systematic, and integrated manner?

*Answer.* Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) has been active in Afghanistan since February 2004. DIILS was part of a Legal Development Training Team (LDTT) engaged in the development of a Comprehensive Legal Officer Training Plan (CLOTP) for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The CLOTP entailed working with eight experienced ANA legal personnel to develop a curriculum and instructional materials for a formal course of instruction for ANA legal officers. The LDTT and the Afghan legal personnel co-authored, co-produced, and implemented the training program and provided the training to a mix of 50 officers from the ANA and the MOD. The goal of this course is that every Afghan legal officer be able to participate and attend this course over the next 1–2 years. This program is under the overall oversight of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for CSTC-A. The SJA is responsible for the conduct of this course and will continue to encourage the cadre of Afghan instructors to implement this program of instruction.

*Question.* What is the Department of Defense's plan to monitor adherence to rule-of-law principles within the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Ministry of Defense and provide follow-up training?

*Answer.* The Department of State is the department responsible for rule-of-law and other governance and development initiatives. Please also see the answer to the previous question.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

*Question.* Admiral Mullen recently predicted that in 2009 the Army would see a record number of suicides. So far this year, the highest reported number of suicides on an Army installation has been at Fort Campbell in my home State of Kentucky, with 11 suicides. I find this deeply troubling. What immediate action is being taken at Fort Campbell to prevent further suicides among soldiers?

*Answer.* In April 2009, the Army published Annex D of the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention which was distributed to Commanders throughout the Army. This was followed by an All-Army Action (ALARACT) from VCSA GEN Peter W. Chiarelli encouraging Commanders to utilize the guidance provided in Annex D. Annex D directs Installation, Garrison and Military Treatment Facility Commanders to optimize efforts of already existing programs by ensuring their coordination, integration, evaluation and marketing. There were specific steps and tasks to be completed in preparation for further ongoing programmatic changes initiated by the group of subject matter experts.

In addition, those experts have worked closely with command elements at Fort Campbell and the Army's Office of the Surgeon General to address the unique needs of the military community at that installation. Consequently, Fort Campbell developed a concept of "resilience teams" which will supplement current medical assets. The resilience team is placed into each Brigade and works closely with unit leaders, soldiers and families to identify high risk individuals. Medical personnel have also been "surged" to Fort Campbell from other installations to supplement existing assets while Fort Campbell works to expeditiously fill vacancies.

Fort Campbell has redistributed its behavioral health assets to maximize access to care among its supported Soldier population, to include relocating some behavioral health assets to fill brigade-level behavioral science officer positions.

In addition, the Army's Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) sent a team to assess whether leadership turnover and training were con-

tributing factors. A senior psychiatrist from the Army Surgeon General's office performed a staff assistance visit in June and will conduct a follow up visit in July.

*Question.* What mental health and counseling resources are currently available to soldiers and their families at Fort Campbell?

Answer. Blanchfield Army Community Hospital (BACH) supports a military population of 78,222 eligible beneficiaries with an average of 8,000 claims per month for mental healthcare in the BACH network area. The current staffing picture for services provided by the Community Counseling Center, Adult Behavior Health Unit, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Unit, Social Work Service and the Family Advocacy Program includes a total of 201 behavioral health providers (military, civilian and contractors). Twenty-five additional positions have been recently funded and filled, and recruiting actions are underway for another 15 positions which are funded, but unfilled. (Information provided by U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General on July 27, 2009.)

In addition to the services listed in the previous paragraph, the Substance Abuse Program currently has eight available counselors and two counselor vacancies. BACH is actively engaged in recruitment efforts to increase the total number of substance abuse counselors to 15. All soldiers are seen on a walk-in basis; however, rehabilitation team meetings are not meeting the 7-day completion standard due to the staffing shortfalls. Group treatment settings are provided for all participating soldiers; however, group participation is limited to generic pre-treatment groups for the first 4–5 weeks, until which time space in specific treatment groups becomes available.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military OneSource (MOS) supplements existing Fort Campbell Army Family programs by providing a 24-hour toll-free information and referral telephone line and Internet/web based service. MOS has received a total of 3,802 calls for counseling with 11 of those resulting in telephonic counseling, 1,455 in-person counseling and 1,200 referrals to in-person counseling. Seventy percent of these contacts were from service members and 30 percent for family members. The top five reasons for in person counseling includes relationship, stress management, depression, personal growth and returning from deployment. All soldiers and their families have access to Military OneSource which provides up to 12 counseling sessions free of charge with providers from the local community.

Each battalion at Fort Campbell has a chaplain who is available for soldiers and family members and there are additional chaplains integrated throughout the installation.

As of June 23, 2009 the U.S. Army OTSG Headquarters reports 2,735 behavioral health providers in the U.S. Army staffing inventory with a current shortfall of 336. This is an increase of 156 providers since the last update provided June 9, 2009 with March 2009 numbers. Funding is available for the shortage of 336 mental health providers. The Army is using a number of incentives with continuous positive outcomes shown in an increase in positions being filled. There continues to be work in the area of determining the correct staffing model and numbers to meet the needs of all locations of the military population.

*Question.* Are these resources going to be increased in light of the rise in the suicide rate? If not, why not?

Answer. Yes, the Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has sent 31 additional behavioral health specialists to support Fort Campbell's soldiers and families. Specifically, it doubled the number of Army Substance Abuse Counselors from 8 to 16; it sent 3 additional psychiatrists, 6 additional clinical psychologists, and 3 additional licensed clinical social workers. These personnel will stay in place at Fort Campbell until permanent military, civilian, and contract personnel arrive at Fort Campbell.

There is a very active and robust recruiting effort at Fort Campbell which aims to fill vacant behavioral health positions while maintaining standards to ensure the highest quality of care for our soldiers and families.

In the interim, Fort Campbell developed a concept of "resilience teams" which will supplement the already existing medical assets at Fort Campbell by placing these teams into each Brigade. These teams will work closely with unit leaders, soldiers and families to identify high risk individuals. Medical personnel have been "surged" to Fort Campbell from other installations to supplement existing assets while Fort Campbell works to expeditiously fill vacancies. In addition, the Army Office of the Surgeon General and MEDCOM are actively reviewing the Automated Staffing Assessment Model to evaluate the necessity of modifying the required number of behavioral health and primary care providers given the effects of protracted conflict on the soldiers, families and the military health system.

*Question.* More broadly, what is the Army doing across the board to address this deeply troubling trend?

Answer. The Army is focusing, but not limiting, its efforts through the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention. This plan was developed through a group of subject matter experts convened by the VCSA GEN Peter W. Chiarelli. The experts developed approximately 250 tasks which span the entire Policy, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Resource (P-DOTMLPeF-R) spectrum and incorporated those tasks in a synchronization matrix. This matrix is a working document and has been staffed with the Army Suicide Prevention Council which is made up of senior representatives from across the Army Staff. The tasks are designed to approach suicide prevention from a holistic perspective with the belief that if we address areas which contribute to suicide, the rate of suicide will decline.

The Army also completed Phase I of Suicide Prevention Training during an unprecedented stand down from February 15 to March 15. The Army is currently executing Phase II of suicide prevention training (March 16 to July 16). Phase III will follow and will consist of ongoing efforts that are developed and modified to address the evolving needs of the Army.

*Question.* Does the military need greater authority or resources in this area? If so, what are they?

Answer. DOD recognizes the need for comprehensive mental health programs to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and their families. The services currently have an estimated staffing need for 4,935 mental health professionals (3,072 Army, 1,011 Air Force and 852 Navy); 479 (9.7 percent) of these positions are unfilled (337 Army, 100 Air Force and 42 Navy). DOD has budgeted over \$1.7 billion and \$1.8 billion for fiscal years 2009–2010 respectively to pay for these shortfalls; significant hiring initiatives and overall progress continue to be made across the services, although challenges remain. We continue to refine our staffing models (accounting for increased deployments, occupational issues, risks for combat-related illness and injuries and cumulative stress on servicemembers and families) in order to best define numbers and types of staffing necessary to most effectively meet our goals of building resilience, reducing stigma and providing timely access to preventive and therapeutic mental healthcare while maintaining servicemember and family satisfaction. Requirements will continue to evolve and additional authorities and resources may be required in the future.

The Nation's overall shortage and maldistribution of mental health providers is a significant impediment to filling our currently funded, yet empty mental health provider billets. According to experts from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Health Resources and Services Administration, a shortage of over 5,000 mental health practitioners exists in the civilian mental health provider communities serving United States underserved areas. This shortage is likely to grow, as witnessed by recent media attention to increased demand for mental health services by the U.S. civilian population as well. The national shortage compounds our problem of attracting non-uniformed providers to the rural areas in which many military installations are located, negatively impacting both military and TRICARE network staffing. Greater authority and resourcing to provide scholarships to civilians-in-training in exchange for medical service within our military health system would benefit DOD mental health professional recruitment efforts.

In an effort to find alternative solutions to the ongoing national mental health professional shortage, Internet technologies are being explored within the military and network health communities. We believe telehealth technologies could be utilized to expand services to military members and their families in these underserved areas. TRICARE Management Activity has recently modified the managed care support contracts to allow Employee Assistance Program level consultations at home. A study protocol for in-home psychiatric consultation capability using these modalities is also being developed. Legislative change providing relief for healthcare provider State licensure requirements and restrictions during telemedicine has the potential to foster greater telemedicine access and would help military families and the Nation as a whole.

Finally, we believe that non-medical factors such as recruitment, retention, training, leadership and stigma are critical aspects of the larger, complex problem which must continue to be closely examined if we are to effectively deal with the issues facing our servicemembers and their families.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

*Question.* I understand the State Department is considering placing North Korea back on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The recent missile tests, nuclear detonation and farcical trial of two American journalists are only the most recent exam-

ples of the North Korean regime's intentionally bellicose actions intended to antagonize the international community and provide diplomatic maneuvering from which to blackmail the rest of the world. The new administration's view of missile defense focuses on rogue state and theater missile threats. It seems especially pertinent at this time to look at the missile defense system in Alaska that has been targeted for reduction.

Is it wise at this point to reduce the number of ground-based interceptors and await the result of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review to determine the best capabilities to defend against threats from an obvious rogue state whose missile are already capable of striking our northern-most state?

Answer. The interceptors in place (to include programmed improvements), plus those planned for in the fiscal year 2010 budget, are sufficient to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat capable of striking U.S. homeland. Given the current shot doctrine, 30 operational GBIs provide sufficient fire power to protect the United States from ICBMs given the number of ICBM launch complexes and the long development time required for additional ICBM launch complexes in North Korea and Iran. The U.S. inventory of operational GBIs may be expanded in the future should the threat grow.

*Question.* The United States has an obvious and immediate interest in the future of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state with a history of military coups, ethnic and religious instability that contains lawless, drug-filled hinterlands that harbor international terrorists. With this explosive mix geographically adjacent to our troops in Afghanistan and cross-border cooperation between drug cartels, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban I am very concerned about our future military plans for the region. I understand the budget request for \$700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund will compliment Department of State efforts and be coupled with the Foreign Military Financing Program underway.

Can you describe in an unclassified setting the contingency plans we may have with regard to the Pakistani military, its nuclear weapons and stability in the region should the Pakistani government fail or be overthrown by Islamic militants?

Answer. The Department of Defense routinely plans for a variety of contingencies around the world. For security reasons, we cannot comment further.

#### SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman INOUE. Our next hearing will be held on June 19 at 10:30, at which time we'll listen to public witnesses.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale, we thank you very much for your service to our country and, through you, we thank the men and women of our uniformed services. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., Tuesday, June 9, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Friday, June 19.]